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January 2026 marks one year into President Donald Trump’s second term, and there can be no honest conversation without acknowledging that he is one of the most consequential presidents in American history. Love him or loathe him, Trump remains the fixed star around which our politics has revolved for the better part of a decade. Every debate, whether on leadership, law, legacy or lack thereof, turns on the outsized presence of one man. His shadow looms across every institution sacred to America, from colleges to the church to the Capitol, forcing each to declare with whom it stands and why. 

Trump has not simply challenged institutions; he has recharted their course. He has created a political environment where presence, leverage and speed prevail — conditions future leaders will inherit whether they admire his legacy or admonish it. What matters now is not merely what Trump disrupted, but what he set in motion. Among other things, Trump reminds us how quickly and how personally a single executive can impact law, markets and society, for better or worse. 

Long after the rallies fade and the indictments recede, Trump’s imprint will continue to shape American life. A remade Supreme Court of hand-picked justices has altered constitutional doctrine for generations to come. Capital markets have come to treat presidential volatility as a warning sign and tradable risk. Tariffs, trade and industrial policy have been recast as blunt instruments of executive will, designed to serve voters as much as economists. Even the once-fringe world of digital assets and crypto has been reframed from libertarian experiment to strategic asset class challenging sovereignty, regulation and power. 

In many other ways, Trump has altered expectations as much as outcomes. He mandated institutions to move faster and challenged political actors to think bigger. That inheritance will not be easily unwound. History’s students of power understand that consequence is measured not only by outcomes, but by what follows, and few made that point more clearly than Henry Kissinger. ‘Trump may be one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up its old pretenses.’

More than anyone else, Trump recognizes that power today flows not only from institutions but from attention. From the time he entered the arena, Trump has perfected one principle: never surrender the stage. Pundits once mocked his early bid for office as self-promotion. It became a populist revolt instead. His blunt voice pierces decades of polite debate. While Washington was accustomed to civility, his words are often raw, sometimes reckless, but always real. Trump’s mastery of attention strains conventional guardrails and has exposed institutional rot long ignored. He leverages disruption to push the boundaries of trust and normalize chaos, conflict and controversy. 

The Trump presidency breaks precedent almost daily — so often it is futile to flag and hard to keep score. He confronts China’s mercantilism with tariffs when others fear retaliation. He moved the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, upending decades of diplomatic orthodoxy. He stepped across the DMZ to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and rolled out the red carpet for Russian President Vladimir Putin. He bombs Venezuelan speed boats presumed to carry contraband and dares the reigning despot to respond, let alone retaliate. And he brusquely deports the undocumented with steely bravado. All of which would have been derided or thought folly not long ago, but now is political reality.  

Supporters see courage; opponents see chaos. Two things can be true. Trump leads by instinct, improvising his own score to the established symphony of power. Policy wonks measure process; his allies measure presence. Rallies replaced town halls. Tweets replaced press conferences. Identity replaced ideology. To millions who felt unseen, he proved they exist. He showed up, stood up and spoke up in a way American presidents never have, and may never again.

Bret Baier: Trump’s personal relationships with Middle East leaders have paid off

Every scandal was forecast as fatal. None has been. Each prosecution, revelation and rebuke only deepened the myth. His mug shot became merchandise, his trials became theater, his adversaries became amplifiers. History honors endurance as much as elegance, if not more. Trump embodies that fact. Cast down, counted out and condemned by critics, his ascendance reflects the character of a long ignored American electorate — disruptive, defiant, determined to be seen.  

Grave legal and ethical questions have dogged the president to be sure. But the paradox persists: efforts to diminish Trump through lawfare have mostly enlarged and emboldened him politically and prompted questions as to whether prosecution has advanced justice or accelerated division. 

Washington still misunderstands the Trump phenomenon. He thrives on friction, force and fear. Attention is both fuel and fortress. While pundits count approval ratings, he commandeers airtime. Flooding the zone is more than a football play; it is a governing philosophy for Trump, who understands that in today’s politics, silence equals extinction. The simple act of tagging opponents with amusingly accurate nicknames bespeaks both instinct and popular appeal; at the same time brilliant and brutal.

Populism in America is cyclical. President Andrew Jackson fought banks; politician William Jennings Bryan fought barons; Louisiana Gov. and then Sen. Huey Long fought inequality; Trump fights systems of every stripe. His crusade is part grievance and part gospel, speaking to a republic that distrusts its own elite institutions and their caretakers. Trump excels at stretching politics into follow-through performance. After all, who else would dare prepend his name to the John F. Kennedy Center for Performing Arts and the U.S. Institute of Peace in real time. 

Foreign-policy mandarins dismiss his unorthodox diplomacy, yet the Abraham Accords reordered alliances few believed possible. Energy independence became a reality under his watch. Europe, once warned about Russian gas dependency, now concedes he was right. NATO member states shoulder greater — though not altogether equitable — burdens. Even critics grudgingly credit him for forcing movement on issues long considered intractable, thus the Nobel nominations. 

American politics has long relished showmanship and public performance, from Jefferson’s pamphlets to Lincoln’s debates. Trump is the latest iteration of that tradition, and the most complete legacy of the social media age. He channels a culture that values performance as proof of conviction. As such, he reflects some of our own national contradictions: moral yet mercenary, religious yet rebellious, democratic yet drawn to dominance.

Scholars will debate Trump’s impact for decades, but his ubiquity is unquestionable. He imbues every poll, every platform, every party calculus. Democrats campaign against him; Republicans campaign around him. He remains bolder and busier than ever. Trump did not just reform the GOP; he broke the mold and recast it as Trump, MAGA and America First. 

Every scandal was forecast as fatal. None has been. Each prosecution, revelation and rebuke only deepened the myth. His mug shot became merchandise, his trials became theater, his adversaries became amplifiers.

Trump’s evangelical supporters remind us that the great men of old were seldom polished and never perfect. Moses killed, yet led his people to freedom. David sinned, yet ruled with vision. Paul persecuted, yet became the greatest apostle. Scripture teaches that imperfection often precedes purpose, and greatness is rarely graceful. The Christian faithful rely on these proverbial lessons when explaining their loyal and unapologetic allegiance to such a coarse Christian. Unlike Elijah, it will be impossible to take up his mantle.

While canonizing Trump would be a stretch, dismissing him would be dishonest. From TV ownership to tariffs to trade and beyond, Trump compels America to confront convention and contradiction at the same time. He challenges America’s heritage of confidence and doubt, conviction and compassion, strength and restraint. And challenges us to rethink long-held axioms. 

Sports analysts often speak of exceptionally gifted athletes as ‘generational talent’ — those who have the extraordinary ability to change the game. That is Trump.

MS NOW guest praises Trump

For those hoping to walk in his shoes, there is no blueprint for replication. He ushered in a unique political reality that history must acknowledge even if it cannot be repeated. As the most consequential political figure of this century thus far, Donald Trump offers history a compelling study in transformational leadership. He is implacable, irreplaceable and impossible to ignore. There has never been, nor will there ever be, another like him. 

Foremost and finally, Trump embodies a new political maxim for today’s America. If you dare to lead, you do not have to be perfect, but you must be present. 


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‘What’s in a name? That which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet.’ That question, posed by Juliet in Shakespeare’s ‘Romeo and Juliet,’ seems to now occupy much of Washington. At a Christmas party with many media from Washington, the question was put to me more succinctly and repeatedly as ‘can they do that?’ The ‘that’ was the renaming of the Kennedy Center as the Trump-Kennedy Center. Soon, courts may have to face this quintessentially Shakespearean question, ‘for never was a story of more woe.’ 

Around Christmas, Ohio Democratic Rep. Joyce Beatty, an ex-officio member of the board, announced her lawsuit over the name change.  

As a threshold matter, I will address the legal rather than policy basis for the change. Many of us chafed at the renaming of the center, which was a memorial to an assassinated president. However, what people want to know is whether the change can be challenged. The answer is yes, but it will not necessarily be easy or certain in its outcome. 

The center was originally built as the National Cultural Center in a 1958 law. It was renamed the John F. Kennedy Center by an act of Congress in 1964 as a living memorial.

The key issue is how that designation was made. It was contained in a statute passed by Congress. Titled John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, 20 U.S.C. 3, states that ‘no additional memorials or plaques in the nature of memorials shall be designated or installed in the public areas of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.’ 

There are exceptions in sections 2 and 3 of the provision: 

‘(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to—

(A) any plaque acknowledging a gift from a foreign country; 

Critics LOSE IT after Trump renames Kennedy Center

(B) any plaque on a theater chair or a theater box acknowledging the gift of such chair or box; and 

(C) any inscription on the marble walls in the north or south galleries, the Hall of States, or the Hall of Nations acknowledging a major contribution; …

(3) For purposes of this subsection, testimonials and benefit performances shall not be construed to be memorials.’ 

The language supports a congressional intent to insulate the memorial from any changes or dilutions. The specificity of the exceptions to plaques for donors suggests that other major changes, such as a name change, are barred under federal law. Moreover, the center is named by an act of Congress. It is hard to find any authority of the board that would undo or delegate that power. 

There is a legitimate question whether a name change is an ‘additional memorial or plaque,’ but it would seem to be so. If a simple plaque to donors had to be expressly exempted, giant letters dedicating the center to an additional person would seem to fall within the congressional intent.

Still, the Trump administration could quote the servant Sampson from ‘Romeo and Juliet’ and tell a court to ‘take it in what sense thou wilt,’ but the statute does not expressly say that name changes are a memorial. 

Challengers could argue that, under the board’s interpretation, any memorial established by Congress, from the Lincoln Memorial to the Kennedy Presidential Library, could be renamed or hyphenated.  

If a court agrees that the statute reflects a clear congressional intent to bar any change to the memorial, the question is how it can be challenged.

In any legal challenge, the advantage would likely rest with the challengers if they can meet the standing requirements.

Kerry Kennedy, the daughter of Robert F. Kennedy and sister of Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., announced that, ‘Three years and one month from today, I’m going to grab a pickax and pull those letters off that building, but I’m going to need help holding the ladder. Are you in? Applying for my carpenter’s card today, so it’ll be a union job!!!’ 

I would not recommend that approach. Most attorneys strive to keep their clients from falling from great heights.  

The question is, who has standing to challenge the change. Are Kennedy family members injured in a concrete way to satisfy standing? Associational standing from historical preservation groups can be tricky. However, some may soon test those waters. 

The most obvious way to address the issue is for Congress to be heard. It can either ratify the board decision, or it could expressly declare the change to be invalid and clarify that ‘additional memorial’ encompasses any name change. Either resolution may prove difficult with the heavily divided Congress. Soon a judge may join Romeo in his lament: ‘O, teach me how I should forget to think!’

First look at Kennedy Center’s holiday spectacular concert for military families

In any legal challenge, the advantage would likely rest with the challengers if they can meet the standing requirements. Otherwise, the name could remain by default … or until another administration decides to make another change to the center previously known as the Kennedy Center. 

Of course, today Juliet might resolve the naming problem in a similar fashion with a hyphenated marital name of Juliet Capulet-Montague, though it clearly would have gone over as poorly as the Trump-Kennedy name. It clearly does not smell as sweet to many.

I expect both court and congressional action to follow. Absent a quick resolution by Congress (which seems unlikely), this could result in years of litigation. 

However, both sides might be wise to heed Shakespeare’s warning in another play that, ‘where two raging fires meet together, they do consume the thing that feeds their fury.’ 


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Elon Musk recently put forth a bold vision: that within two decades, AI will automate virtually all productive activity, work will be optional, and money will lose meaning. Coming from Musk, such pronouncements carry gravitas. And noticeably, the expressed vision unsurprisingly dovetails neatly with Musk’s admittedly exciting entrepreneurial visions. 

Yet variants of those claims have circulated for years, usually without reference to economic theory, institutional constraints, or political risk. Rigorously examining those assertions is essential to decouple technological optimism from the practical realities that will shape the next two decades.

Will Work Be Optional in 20 Years?

In economic terms, “work optionality” requires three simultaneous conditions: (1) per-capita output high enough that the median person can maintain a high standard of living without paid labor, (2) widespread, reliable distribution mechanisms, and (3) institutional stability that ensures income security over time. None of those conditions are close to existing.

Even if AI substitutes for large swaths of labor, historically new automation has reallocated work rather than completely eliminating it. New goods, new services, and new forms of status competition appear as old ones disappear. Moreover, without explicit redistribution mechanisms — which no major nation has implemented — the owners of AI capital capture the lion’s share of gains. That, if anything, requires the median individual to work more, not less.

Musk’s claim requires the total (or near-total) automation of the entire global capital stock, universally broad redistribution of payment streams or wealth, and stable political institutions, all within twenty years. Even considering $38 trillion of US public debt, setting aside lumpiness of capital flows, uneven innovation in various places around the world, differing views on the sanctity of labor and countless other potential obstacles, that is an extraordinary compression of time, capital formation, and global diffusion.

When Musk says that “work will be optional,” no different than choosing to grow vegetables in one’s backyard for fun, he is insinuating a world where production is fully automated and money scarcely matters. But such a future requires astronomically more than clever automation. It demands the near-total overhaul of the global capital stock, new mechanisms for distributing income in the absence of labor markets, and political systems stable enough to address a world where everyone receives sustenance without working. Considering $38 Trillion in US public debt, wildly uneven innovation and development across nations and continents, and deep cultural disagreements about the value and role of work, fitting that transformation into a twenty-year window would require an inconceivable compression of capital formation and institutional evolution. 

Will Money “Lose Meaning?”

For money to lose meaning, scarcity must disappear. But scarcity is not abolished by robots, however intelligent they are or however cheaply they make goods. Scarcity arises because:

  • Consumer preferences differ.
  • Time matters (now vs later).
  • Land, location, status, political influence, and other constraints make some goods unavoidably rivalrous.

As individuals become wealthier, their consumption tends to shift from goods toward services. Even in a world with ultra-cheap production methods, services, and in particular positional and experiential goods, will dominate utility at high income levels. Access to desirable neighborhoods, exclusive schools, bespoke clubs, rare experiences, or political influence cannot be automated into abundance. Prices will continue to ration those services, and money, even if it changes form, remains the social mechanism that expresses relative value.

What could disappear is wage labor as the primary mechanism for accessing consumption. But that would not constitute an “end of money;” it would instead signify a shift in the income structure of society. One characterized by more capital income, more redistribution, perhaps more universal transfers. A world where “money loses meaning” is one where the economy violates the core assumptions of microeconomics, macroeconomics, and game theory. Artificial intelligence does not do that.

What Actually Matters: Capital, Diffusion, and Institutions

Musk’s vision treats AI as a profound, exogenous leap. Economic systems change, however, only through capital deepening, technological diffusion, and institutional adaptation.

At the very least, replacing the existing global capital stock with AI-augmented systems is a many-decade project. Upgrading energy grids, fitting logistics networks to the speed of AI, remaking industrial processes and transportation fleets, and all the other necessary upgrades of the global industrial base will take orders of magnitude longer than updating software. They require planning, investment, and training for complementary human skills. Each is additionally likely to be a target of hefty regulation, slowing that update process all the more. 

Second, technology diffuses unevenly. Historically, the highest-productivity technologies take decades to spread across countries, sectors, and classes. Under any realistic model of diffusion, any optionality where work is considered will arrive at vastly different times for different nations and the internal strata of their societies.

If that weren’t enough to cast doubt on the idea of work’s future irrelevance, prevailing institutions condition everything. Whether AI abundance produces universal prosperity or vast inequality depends entirely on property rights, competition policy, the rule of law, and stable governance. None of those variables can be automated by graphics processing units (GPUs). AI is indeed likely to be transformative, but productivity shocks are not destiny. 

Institutions, formal and informal, ultimately determine whether a society captures, mismanages, or squanders technological abundance.

AI vs. War, Famine, Pandemic, or Totalitarianism

The argument that rapid AI progress will reduce geopolitical danger is beyond economics; it may simply be a category error. Military conflict, agricultural collapse, disease, or authoritarian risk are not functions of the density of automation or its calculative capacity; they are functions of incentives, history, institutional weakness, and human failings.

If anything, AI may foster volatility: consider the long shadow likely to be cast by autonomous weapons, algorithmic political decision-making, and cyber vulnerabilities. Asymmetries in access to the most advanced AI at any given moment could increase international insecurity, not reduce it. Rapid automation may escalate resource competition, foster nationalist resentment, and shift paranoid regimes into overdrive.

Consider the impact of AI on already totalitarian regimes: thusly augmented, oppressive states become more capable, not more benign. Surveillance, social-credit systems, censorship, predictive crackdowns, and digital repression scale boundlessly with AI. North Korea, Cuba, and scores of other unfree nations will not suddenly liberalize because machines capture data and deliver higher productivity. Existential political risks are not reduced by AI abundance; they may, on the other hand, be amplified by it.

Must We ‘Get There Faster to Avoid Suffering?’

The view that a faster transition is better is nothing but an assumption. It may reflect a candid attempt at regulatory relief or direct government subsidies. In welfare-economic terms, though, the transition to an AI-dominated economy may be more painful than life at the destination itself. Rapid automation can produce unemployment, wealth concentration, social unrest, and political extremism. On top of that, the groups most harmed by the transition have extremely high marginal utility of consumption, which means that transitional losses will weigh heavily upon them.

Optimal diffusion may require gradual adoption precisely because societies need time to adjust: retraining, workplace changes, safety mechanisms, new institutional frameworks, and so on. A reckless sprint to automation might generate more conflict, not less. An adaptive, organic trajectory is far more aligned with empirical economic behavior and political stability. 

But that trajectory cannot be centrally planned. When governments attempt to dictate the timing of transformative technological rollouts — as some are already preparing for or attempting to — they almost always set the pace either too fast — triggering backlash and disruption — or too slow, stifling innovation and growth. Competitive market processes, though imperfect, tend to reveal a more measured rate of adoption than bureaucratically-imposed timelines.

A High-Tech Future, Without The Fiction

AI will significantly reshape the global economy. Productivity may rise sharply in certain sectors, returns on certain forms and mixes of capital may spike, labor markets will inevitably reorganize, and while some degree of both structural and frictional unemployment may result, new industries will emerge. But none of this implies an end of work, scarcity, money, or political acrimony. Across the past century, figures from Keynes to Jeremy Rifkin, Martin Ford, and Erik Brynjolfsson have predicted that technological progress, especially automation and artificial intelligence, ultimately make large portions of human labor unnecessary. Similar post-work visions appear in futurist/science fiction and political writing, from Marshall Brain’s Manna to post-scarcity theorists and Silicon Valley leaders like Ray Kurzweil, all of whom see automation pushing societies to rethink income, purpose, and the role of work itself.

AI is likely to magnify prosperity, but it will also magnify risks, and it cannot fundamentally change human nature. A better description of what AI will create is leverage in the economic, political, and military realms. What nations choose to do with that leverage will determine the future. Technology cannot, and does not, erase incentives, undermine money, or invalidate scarcity. It only changes the terrain on which human beings pursue them.

President Donald Trump warned early Friday that the U.S. would intervene if Iran started killing protesters. 

Writing on Truth Social, the president said if Iran shoots and ‘violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue.’ 

‘We are locked and loaded and ready to go,’ Trump said. 

Trump’s warning comes as demonstrations triggered by Iran’s deteriorating economy expand beyond the capital and raise concerns about a potential heavy-handed crackdown by security forces. At least seven people — including protesters and members of Iran’s security services — have been reported killed during clashes, according to international reporting.

Some of the most severe violence has been reported in western Iran, where videos circulating online appeared to show fires burning in streets and the sound of gunfire during nighttime protests. 

The unrest marks Iran’s most significant protests since 2022, when the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in police custody sparked nationwide demonstrations. Officials say the current protests have not yet reached the same scale or intensity, but they have spread to multiple regions and include chants directed at Iran’s theocratic leadership.

Iran’s civilian government under reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian has signaled a willingness to engage with protesters, but the administration faces limited options as the country’s economy continues to deteriorate. Iran’s currency has sharply depreciated, with roughly 1.4 million rials now required to buy a single U.S. dollar, intensifying public anger and eroding confidence in the government.

State television reported the arrests of several people accused of exploiting the unrest, including individuals it described as monarchists and others allegedly linked to Europe-based groups. Authorities also claimed security forces seized smuggled weapons during related operations, though details remain limited.

The demonstrations come amid heightened regional tensions following a 12-day conflict with Israel in June, during which the United States bombed Iranian nuclear sites. Iranian officials have since said the country is no longer enriching uranium, attempting to signal openness to renewed negotiations over its nuclear program to ease sanctions.

However, talks have yet to resume, as both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have warned Tehran against reconstituting its nuclear capabilities — adding further pressure on Iran’s leadership as protests continue.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.


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Josef Schachter, president and author at the Schachter Energy Report, shares his thoughts on oil and natural gas prices, supply and demand in 2026.

‘I think before the cycle is over, the 2007 high of US$147 (per barrel) will be breached, because the industry cannot respond quickly by bringing on new oil,’ he said.

Securities Disclosure: I, Charlotte McLeod, hold no direct investment interest in any company mentioned in this article.

This post appeared first on investingnews.com

A securities lawsuit involving DeFi Technologies (NASDAQ:DEFT) highlights growing regulatory scrutiny on corporate crypto treasury strategies, signaling risks for investors eyeing similar plays.

While many crypto firms have faced class actions, the difference with the DeFi Technologies case is apparent: it targets operational delays and disclosure risks within a corporate treasury.

Most previous crypto lawsuits have concentrated on more common issues, such as promoter liability, token sales or exchange collapses, which primarily hit platforms and promoters.

Specifically, the DeFi Technologies lawsuit alleges that the company hid delays in its core DeFi arbitrage trading, its main revenue driver, while downplaying competition from rival digital asset treasury firms (DATs).

The class action, which seeks to represent those who purchased or acquired DeFi Technologies shares between May 12 and November 14 of this year, comes after two recent share price drops for the company.

Amid emerging risks in the DeFi space, the governance expert emphasized the need for clear business strategies and disclosures to shareholders, and highlighted the role of independent third-party advisors to protect boards.

DeFi Technologies lawsuit breakdown

Plaintiffs claim that DeFi Technologies misled investors from May to November 2025 by issuing revenue guidance of US$218.6 million, despite arbitrage execution snags and rivals eroding its edge.

The company’s share price fell more than 7 percent on November 6 after it issued an update, then crashed over 27 percent between November 14 and 17. The second decline was triggered by the release of its Q3 results — the firm reported a 20 percent revenue miss, cut its 2025 guidance to US$116.6 million and shifted its CEO to an advisory role.

Unlike typical crypto suits over token sales or exchange collapses, this one targets a corporate treasury’s operational delays in DeFi yield strategies, exposing how arbitrage hiccups and DAT rivals demand precise disclosures.

“I think it’s an indicator that we’re going to see more questions and concerns surrounding the regulatory environment and disclosures, because we kind of hit into uncharted … territory very rapidly,” said Bishara.

The lawsuit arrives amid new fair-value accounting rules, testing board liability for strategy risks before 2026 filings.

Operational value vs. crypto laundering

An emerging concern for regulators and investors is the distinction between companies with genuine transactional components and those using public markets to create artificial liquidity.

Bishara noted that smaller companies divesting from core businesses to pivot toward crypto could become targets for regulatory scrutiny due to a perceived change in control.

From his perspective, firms primarily pursuing a treasury strategy could come under fire for potentially prioritizing short-term stock value and liquidation over the best interests of shareholders.

In these smaller transactions, Bishara suggested that the shift can be viewed as a way to convert illiquid digital assets into US dollars by selling stock in the open market.

“You’re converting something that I can’t really sell, and I can’t really buy a piece of pizza with … and turning it into something that I can buy a piece of pizza with,” the expert explained. “It’s almost like laundering crypto into currency,” he added, clarifying that this is not a one-size-fits-all accusation.

Consequently, he believes investors should look for companies whose underlying business models have operational potential, rather than those focused purely on digital asset transactions.

Board oversight and fiduciary duty

The rapid evolution of DeFi has fundamentally outpaced the regulatory frameworks designed to govern it.

For investors, the DeFi Technologies case underscores the danger of imprecise disclosures around crypto assets, particularly when firms pivot their strategies without clear communication to shareholders.

Bishara observed that as stock volatility triggers these types of lawsuits, corporate boards are being forced to rethink the practical applications of their fiduciary responsibility.

To fulfill their duty to shareholders, the expert argued that boards must engage in active, expert-led evaluation. Engaging independent third-party advisors, such as attorneys or investment bankers, to evaluate crypto treasury deals will insulate and help companies protect themselves in this uncharted territory.

From his perspective, this process effectively transfers some of the risk from board members to advisors.

Bishara further emphasized the importance of documenting the specific evaluation of a transaction in board minutes, noting that if a director disagrees with a crypto strategy, they should “disagree with it in the minutes” in order to ensure that their individual interests are protected.

The need for rigorous board oversight is being driven home by the insurance market. Bishara observed that even if a company’s actual risk profile has not changed, the cost of mitigating risk through Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance is skyrocketing as the number of carriers willing to underwrite these risks has shrunk significantly.

“I am quite certain that we are going to see policy language that specifically discusses or removes some of these potential pieces of liability, specifically in companies that are not insuring for these types of transactions,” Bishara predicted, adding that standard insurance companies will likely add no-crypto clauses to their policies.

“I would definitely expect that more, not from the crypto underwriters, but more from the non-crypto underwriters, to really make sure that they’re not winding up on a risk accidentally,’ he also noted.

For investors, Bishara suggested that a company’s inability to secure affordable D&O insurance should be viewed as a significant red flag regarding the health of its balance sheet.

Investor takeaway

Bishara’s front-row seat to operational crypto-utility and high-frequency transactional modeling has helped shape his view of where the market is headed in 2026 and beyond. While the DAT model dominated the 2024/2025 cycle, he believes the space is rapidly evolving into a new phase of business.

“I think it’s a great space for really exploring how the world is going to evolve and change,” he said.

For investors, the key to long-term value may lie in distinguishing between a company that is simply HODLing, and a firm that is building a transactional component.

Bishara pointed to emerging business models where firms are moving beyond treasury strategies to become operational, transactional companies that use crypto to power everyday transactions.

As the 2026 regulatory and insurance landscape tightens, focus will likely shift away from those chasing short-term stock premiums and toward those using DeFi to build sustainable, potentially undervalued business models.

Securities Disclosure: I, Meagen Seatter, hold no direct investment interest in any company mentioned in this article.

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President Donald Trump spent the first year of his second White House term signing a torrent of executive orders aimed at delivering on several major policy priorities, including slashing federal agency budgets and staffing, implementing a hard-line immigration crackdown and invoking emergency authority to impose steep tariffs on nearly every U.S. trading partner.

The pace of Trump’s executive actions has far outstripped that of his predecessors, allowing the administration to move quickly on campaign promises. But the blitz has also triggered a wave of lawsuits seeking to block or pause many of the orders, setting up a high-stakes confrontation over the limits of presidential power under Article II and when courts can — or should — intervene.

Lawsuits have challenged Trump’s most sweeping and consequential executive orders, ranging from a ban on birthright citizenship and transgender service members in the military to the legality of sweeping, DOGE-led government cuts and the president’s ability to ‘federalize’ and deploy thousands of National Guard troops.

Many of those questions remain unresolved. Only a few legal fights tied to Trump’s second-term agenda have reached final resolution, a point legal experts say is critical as the administration presses forward with its broader agenda.

Trump allies have argued the president is merely exercising his powers as commander in chief. 

Critics counter that the flurry of early executive actions warrants an additional level of legal scrutiny, and judges have raced to review a crushing wave of cases and lawsuits filed in response.

WINS:

Limits on nationwide injunctions

In June 2025, the Supreme Court sided with the Trump administration 6-3 in Trump v. CASA, a closely watched case centered on the power of district courts to issue so-called universal or nationwide injunctions blocking a president’s executive orders. 

Though the case ostensibly focused on birthright citizenship, arguments narrowly focused on the authority of lower courts’ ability to issue nationwide injunctions and did not wade into the legality of Trump’s order, which served as the legal pretext for the case. The decision had sweeping national implications, ultimately affecting the more than 310 federal lawsuits that had been filed at the time challenging Trump’s orders signed in his second presidential term.

Justices on the high court ultimately sided with U.S. Solicitor General John Sauer, who had argued to the court that universal injunctions exceeded lower courts’ Article III powers under the Constitution, telling justices that the injunctions ‘transgress the traditional bounds of equitable authority,’ and ‘create a host of practical problems.’

The Supreme Court largely agreed. Justices ruled that plaintiffs seeking nationwide relief must file their lawsuits as class action challenges. This prompted a flurry of action from plaintiffs in the weeks and months that followed as they raced to amend and refile relevant complaints to lower courts.

Firing independent agency heads 

The Supreme Court also signaled openness to expanding presidential authority over independent agencies.

Earlier in 2025, the justices granted Trump’s request to pause lower-court orders reinstating two Democratic appointees — National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) member Gwynne Wilcox and Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) member Cathy Harris, two Democrat appointees who were abruptly terminated by the Trump administration. It also suggested the Supreme Court is poised to pare back a 90-year-old precedent in Humphrey’s Executor, a 1935 ruling that prohibits certain heads of multi-member, congressionally created federal regulatory agencies from being fired without cause.

It is not the only issue in which the justices appeared inclined to side with Trump administration officials and either overturn or pare back Humphrey’s protections.

In December, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Trump v. Slaughter, a similar case centered on Trump’s attempt to fire a member of the Federal Trade Commission without cause. Justices seemed likely to allow the firing to proceed and to weaken Humphrey’s protections for similarly situated federal employees, though the extent that justices will move to dilute an already watered-down court ruling remains unclear.

The high court will also review another case centered on Trump’s ability to remove Federal Reserve Board Governor Lisa Cook early in 2026.

LOSSES:

Tariffs 

While it’s rarely helpful to speculate on how the Supreme Court might rule on a certain case, court watchers and legal experts overwhelmingly reached a similar consensus after listening to oral arguments in Learning Resources v. Trump, the case centered on Trump’s use of an emergency wartime law to enact his sweeping tariff plan. 

At issue in the case is Trump’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to enact his steep 10% tariffs on most imports. The IEEPA law gives the president broad economic powers in the event of a national emergency tied to foreign threats. But it’s unclear if such conditions exist, as voiced by liberal and conservative justices in their review of the case earlier in 2025.

Several justices also noted that the statute does not explicitly reference tariffs or taxes, a point that loomed large during oral arguments.

A ruling against the administration would deliver a major blow to Trump’s signature economic policy. 

Court watchers and legal experts said after arguments that a Trump administration win could be more difficult than expected, though each cautioned it is hard to draw conclusions from roughly two hours of oral arguments, a fraction of the total time justices spend reviewing a case.

Jonathan Turley, a law professor and Fox News contributor, said in a blog post that the justices ‘were skeptical and uncomfortable with the claim of authority, and the odds still favored the challengers.’

‘However, there is a real chance of a fractured decision that could still produce an effective win for the administration,’ Turley added.

Brent Skorup, a legal fellow at the CATO Institute, told Fox News Digital in an emailed statement that members of the court seemed uncomfortable with expanding presidential power over tariffs.

‘Most justices appeared attentive to the risks of deferring to a president’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute and the executive branch ‘discovering’ new powers in old statutes,’ Skorup said.

Birthright citizenship

The Supreme Court has agreed to review Trump’s executive order restricting birthright citizenship, one of the most legally consequential actions of his second term.

At issue is an executive order Trump signed on his first day back in office that would deny automatic U.S. citizenship to most children born to illegal immigrant parents or parents with temporary legal status, a sweeping change critics say would upend roughly 150 years of constitutional precedent.

The order immediately sparked a flurry of lawsuits in 2025 filed by dozens of U.S. states and immigrants’ rights groups. Opponents have also argued that the effort is an unconstitutional and ‘unprecedented’ one that would threaten some 150,000 children in the U.S. born annually to parents of noncitizens and an estimated 4.4 million American-born children under 18 who are living with an illegal immigrant parent, according to data from the Pew Research Center. 

To date, no court has sided with the Trump administration’s interpretation of the 14th Amendment, though multiple district courts have blocked the order from taking force.

While it’s unclear how the high court might rule, the lower court rulings suggest the Trump administration might face a steep uphill battle in arguing the case before the Supreme Court in early 2026.

The court said in early December it will hold oral arguments in the case in 2026, between February and April, with a ruling expected by the end of June. 


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As 2025 ends, tensions between China and Taiwan are higher — and more overt — than at any point in recent years, fueled by expanded U.S. military support for Taipei, increasingly bold warnings from regional allies, and Chinese military drills that look less like symbolism and more like rehearsal.

Beijing has spent the year steadily increasing pressure on Taiwan through large-scale military exercises, air and naval incursions, and pointed political messaging, while Washington and its allies have responded with sharper deterrence signals that China now openly labels as interference.

The result is a more volatile status quo — one where the risk of miscalculation has grown, even as most analysts stop short of predicting an imminent Chinese invasion.

A year of escalating pressure

China capped off 2025 with what it described as its largest Taiwan-focused military exercises to date, launching expansive drills in December that included live-fire elements and simulated island encirclement operations.

The exercises followed a familiar pattern seen throughout the year: People’s Liberation Army aircraft and ships operating closer to Taiwan with greater frequency, reinforcing Beijing’s claim of sovereignty while testing Taipei’s response capacity.

Unlike earlier shows of force, the late-year drills were widely interpreted as practice for coercive scenarios short of outright war — particularly a blockade or quarantine designed to strangle Taiwan economically and politically without triggering immediate global conflict.

Chinese officials explicitly tied the escalation to Washington’s actions, pointing to a massive U.S. arms package approved in December — valued at roughly $11 billion and described as one of the largest such sales to Taiwan in years — as proof of what Beijing calls ‘foreign interference.’

Chinese officials have been unusually blunt in their response.

‘Any external forces that attempt to intervene in the Taiwan issue or interfere in China’s internal affairs will surely smash their heads bloody against the iron walls of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,’ China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said in a Monday statement. 

The arms package continued the U.S. push to strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses, including missiles, drones and systems designed to complicate a Chinese assault rather than match Beijing weapon-for-weapon.

Taipei welcomed the support but remained cautious in its public response, emphasizing restraint while warning that Chinese military pressure has become routine rather than exceptional.

Japan steps into the frame

One of the most consequential shifts in 2025 came not from Washington or Taipei, Taiwan, but from Tokyo.

In November, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made unusually direct remarks linking a potential Taiwan contingency to Japan’s own security, suggesting that an attack on Taiwan could trigger collective self-defense considerations under Japanese law.

The comments marked one of the clearest acknowledgments yet from a sitting Japanese leader that a Taiwan conflict would not remain a bilateral issue between Beijing and Taipei.

China reacted angrily, accusing Japan of abandoning its post-war restraint and aligning itself with U.S. efforts to contain Beijing. The rhetoric underscored a growing Chinese concern: that any move on Taiwan would draw in a widening coalition of U.S. allies.

That concern has also been reinforced by U.S. treaty commitments to the Philippines, where Chinese and Philippine vessels clashed repeatedly in the South China Sea throughout the year, raising fears of a multifront crisis.

Washington’s deterrence gamble

For the United States, 2025 was defined by a balancing act — reinforcing Taiwan without triggering the very conflict Washington seeks to prevent.

In addition to the December arms package, U.S. officials repeatedly reaffirmed that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are vital U.S. interests, while avoiding any explicit shift away from long-standing strategic ambiguity.

The Pentagon’s annual report on China, released late in 2025, reiterated that U.S. defense assessments see the Chinese military developing capabilities that could enable it to fight and win a war over Taiwan by 2027 — a benchmark that has increasingly shaped U.S. and allied planning.

U.S. officials, however, have also cautioned that military readiness does not equal intent, warning against treating exercises or procurement timelines as a countdown clock to war.

Is an invasion coming?

The question hanging over the region — and Washington — is whether China is moving closer to launching a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

The evidence cuts both ways.

On one hand, the scale and sophistication of Chinese military activity around Taiwan has grown noticeably, with drills emphasizing joint operations, rapid mobilization and isolation of the island. Beijing’s rhetoric has also hardened, portraying reunification as increasingly urgent and framing U.S. involvement as an existential threat.

On the other hand, an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be among the most complex military operations in modern history, carrying enormous political, economic and military risks for China — whose armed forces have not fought a major war since its 1979 invasion of Vietnam.

Many defense analysts argue that Beijing has strong incentives to continue applying pressure through gray-zone tactics — cyber operations, economic coercion, legal warfare and military intimidation — rather than crossing the threshold into open war.

The December drills reinforced that view, highlighting blockade-style scenarios that could test Taiwan and its partners without immediately triggering a shooting war.

The road ahead

As 2026 approaches, the Taiwan Strait remains a flashpoint where deterrence and coercion are colliding more frequently and more visibly.

The most widely held assessment among U.S. and regional officials is that while the risk of conflict is rising — particularly as China approaches its 2027 military readiness goals — an invasion is not yet the most likely near-term outcome.

Instead, the danger lies in sustained pressure, miscalculation and crisis escalation, especially as more actors — from Japan to the Philippines — become directly implicated in the Taiwan equation.

For now, 2025 ends with no shots fired across the Taiwan Strait — but with fewer illusions about how close the region may be to its most serious test in decades.


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Republican Rep. Wesley Hunt of Texas is calling for the complete and permanent abolition of diversity, equity and inclusion ideology, noting that he only wants to be judged based on his ‘character,’ ‘competence’ and ‘results.’

‘DEI should be abolished, permanently. I never want to be chosen, promoted, or rewarded because of how I look. I want to earn every opportunity on merit, through hard work, grit, discipline, and determination,’ the Army veteran declared in a post on X.

‘Equality means equal standards, not engineered outcomes. The dignity of achievement comes from effort, not entitlement. Judge me by my character, my competence, and my results. Anything less is an insult to everyone striving to be their best,’ he added.

Billionaire business tycoon Elon Musk heartily endorsed the lawmaker’s comments.

‘And this is how anyone of honor should be!’ Musk wrote when sharing Hunt’s post on X.

Wesley Hunt defends Trump

Hunt has previously expressed his disdain for DEI.

‘DEI should be DOA,’ he wrote in a May 2025 post on X. ‘America was built on merit, grit, determination, and hard work—not skin color, quotas, or political games. The promise of this nation is simple: we rise by the strength of our character, not the shade of our skin. I’ve lived by that truth—and it drives the left absolutely insane.’ 

Army vet congressman: ‘You can’t walk around looking like the Pillsbury Doughboy and expect people to follow you into battle:’

The lawmaker, who has served in the U.S. House of Representatives since 2023, is running for U.S. Senate, challenging incumbent Republican Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, who is up for re-election this year. Lone Star State Attorney General Ken Paxton is also aiming to unseat Cornyn in the Republican U.S. Senate primary.


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The most credible exception to the case for free trade policy is rooted in concerns about national security. If complete freedom of trade jeopardizes our national security, some protectionism arguably is justified because, as even Adam Smith insisted, although free trade is enriching and important, “defence … is of much more importance than opulence.”

As Smith’s statement implies, protectionism pursued for purposes of national defense will reduce the country’s material well-being, but this cost is worth paying if the protectionist measures result in a large enough enhancement of national security. (Caleb Petitt argues, not implausibly, that Smith really didn’t believe that national-security concerns justify a retreat from free trade. But that’s a topic for another time.)

While most free traders today admit the national-security exception, they also warn that it’s very easy to abuse, as shouts of “national security!” are given enormous deference by the public and politicians. Free traders also warn that, even when the national-security exception isn’t intentionally abused, extraordinary care is required to prevent its application from undermining its goal of promoting national security. The surprising practical difficulty of identifying trade-policy measures that are most likely to adequately protect national security is revealed by two recent developments regarding US trade with China.

Semiconductors

The Trump administration lifted controls that restricted Nvidia’s exports of its H200 chips to China. (The administration made this move in exchange for the US government getting 25 percent of Nvidia’s revenues from these sales — an unjustifiable condition, but also a topic for another time.) The Editorial Board of the Wall Street Journal worries that China’s access to these chips will boost that country’s prospects of surpassing the US in AI technology. The reason, as described by the Journal’s Editors, is that advanced chips such as the H200s “are needed to train advanced AI models.” Unable so far to develop their own advanced chips, the Chinese will now use Nvidia’s chips to further “Beijing’s ambitions to dominate biotech, quantum computing and military power.”

Quite possibly, the Trump administration’s lifting of these controls will indeed undermine US national security. But also, quite possibly not. By supplying the bigger market opened to it by access to China, Nvidia can perhaps take advantage of larger economies of scale that will further improve its chip-making efficiency. And more-efficient advanced microchip production by a company such as Nvidia will, in turn, strengthen US national security.

In addition, Nvidia officials and the White House argue that Chinese dependence on non-Chinese advanced chips diminishes China’s prospects of developing its own advanced chips — an effect that also plausibly promotes US national security by retarding Chinese chip technology. Although acknowledging that this argument has some merit, the Journal believes that it doesn’t carry the day. The Journal worries that the improved computing power that China gains as a result of its access to the H200 chips will further, rather than frustrate, Beijing’s quest for AI dominance.

I have no idea which of these two arguments — to not restrict Nvidia’s sales of H200 chips to China or to restrict these sales — is correct. Not only do both have merit, neither argument seems strong enough to clearly defeat the other. And that’s the point. 

Economic arrangements and interdependence today are so enormously complex that the apparent, indisputable validity of simple statements about the need to impose import or export restrictions in the name of national defense often dissolves upon inspection.

Critical Minerals

So-called “rare-earth” minerals present another such conundrum. Rare-earth minerals aren’t rare; they exist all over the globe, including in the United States, where new deposits of such minerals continue to be discovered. China, however, has become the world’s leading producer of these minerals, many of which have military significance. But guess which country is the world’s second-leading producer: the United States.

So why is the White House boasting of its recent deal with the Chinese government,  committing China to avoid restricting its exports of rare earths? The conventional national-security exception to the case for free trade would have the US government impose restrictions on US imports of rare earths in order to stimulate more domestic production of these critical minerals. Therefore, when the Chinese government imposed restrictions on that country’s exports of rare earths, it did for the US economy precisely what conventional national-security trade policy would have the US government do: protect the US market from foreign supplies of these critical minerals as a means of encouraging more US production.

And yet, even on narrow national-security grounds, the White House might here be correct.

The most obvious defense of the White House’s position is that ramping up US production of rare earths would take too long. Perhaps restricted access now to Chinese-supplied rare earths would weaken US national security in the short run so severely as to outweigh any long-run benefits. This possibility is both real and not remote, yet it is typically ignored by most people who invoke the national-security exception to the case for free trade. Tariff-induced expansion of any industry takes time. This reality surely means that, even for resources and outputs that are indisputably vital for national defense, national security sometimes is better served by continuing, without tariffs, our reliance on foreigners.

There’s a second reason why the White House might be justified in bragging of its rare-earths deal with Beijing (although this reason is unlikely actually to have occurred to today’s White House officials). Were China to continue to severely restrict its exports of rare earths to the US, the resulting expansion of the US rare-earths industry would necessarily entail a shrinkage of some other US industries. Even if this expansion in rare-earths production were fully achieved overnight, if the US industries that, as a result, shrink are industries that produce militarily significant outputs, the net effect on US national defense might well be neutral or negative.

This possibility is also one that’s not remote. The specialized knowledge and labor skills that are best used to mine and process rare-earth minerals are likely to be found in disproportionately large numbers in related industries, such as petroleum and ore production, rather than in economically distant industries such as leisure and entertainment. A tariff-induced expansion of US rare-earths production, therefore, might well come at too high a price in terms of the contraction of other militarily important US industries.

I write “might” attentively. This ambiguity is real and has relevance for policy-making. It should always be taken into account. No one knows if the national-security benefits of increased domestic production of rare earths will exceed, or be exceeded by, the national-security detriments of reduced domestic production of other outputs. 

Even if in any particular case the trade-policy decision proves to weaken rather than strengthen national security, greater recognition of such ambiguity would, over time, result not only in improved trade policy but also a stronger national defense.

Security Requires Humility

The above observations are offered not to render the national-security exception to the case for free trade null, but to caution against its overuse. The Trump administration’s recent treatment of the exportation of American-made advanced microchips, along with its actions regarding rare-earth minerals, each in its own way demonstrates (if unintentionally) the shallowness of the conventional advice to protect any and all industries that produce outputs judged to be important for national security.