A year or so ago, I met my friend’s mother for the first time at a wedding. She told me that she was Mississippi born and raised, but that after her kids were born she and her husband decided to move to North Carolina. Turns out the whole extended family was from Mississippi, still lives there, still loves it there.

“Why did you leave?” I asked.

“Because we had little kids, and the schools were terrible.”

Her answer didn’t surprise me – I’d heard about Mississippi’s bad schools before. But while its schools were terrible enough to induce a cross-country move when her kids (now in their mid-twenties) were young, that’s no longer the case. 

Mississippi has become an educational role model, a shining example of what’s possible inside public schools. It’s a turnaround story no one expected.

Mississippi is, on average, a state that people leave. It has the fourth-lowest in-migration rate in the country (only Louisiana, Michigan, and Ohio have fewer transplants from other states), while 36 percent of its young people move out-of-state. On net, its population is shrinking. Between 2020 and 2024, 16,000 more Mississippi residents died than were born.

Mississippi is a state known for its poverty, its unreliable infrastructure, and its substandard health care system – as well as its poor overall public health. It leads the nation in pregnancy-related deaths and high infant mortality rates. Its capital city, Jackson, has contamination issues with its water supply (with an annual average of 55 breaks per 100 miles of water line, nearly four times the national safety limit of 15). Mississippi consistently comes in as the poorest state in the country, with one in four Mississippi children living below the poverty line.

It’s not a state most Americans look to as a role model.

But over the past fifteen years, this unassuming Deep South state has been quietly pulling off one of the most impressive feats in American public education: while literacy rates around the nation have been falling, Mississippi’s have been steadily rising.

Historically, Mississippi’s school system performed about as well as its health care system and its economy: that is, near the bottom in the national rankings. For years, Mississippi ranked 50 out of 50 in the country for K-12 education. But all that changed in 2013, when Mississippi implemented the Literacy-Based Promotion and embraced the science of reading, overhauling its K-3 literacy curriculum and its teacher training.

Since 2013, Mississippi’s overall K-12 achievement scores have improved significantly. In 2013, Mississippi came in 49 out of 50 states on the NAEP (Nation’s Report Card) for fourth grade reading. In 2021, that number jumped to 21 – and in 2024, it rose all the way to ninth in the nation.

All of this was achieved while Mississippi faced a slew of challenges: teacher shortages, low teacher pay, and under-resourced special education programs, to name a few – the things critics so often point to as the culprits for poor educational outcomes. And all of this was achieved too in a state where 26-28 percent of its students are living below the poverty line – the children who are historically the most underserved (and therefore the lowest performing) students in the country.

All these challenges make Mississippi’s achievements more impressive, and the conclusion more irrefutable: reading science works. A measured, methodical, science-driven approach to teaching literacy results in – you guessed it – unprecedented levels of literacy.

That should not be a headline. And yet it is, printed and reprinted all over the country, colloquially referred to as “the Mississippi Miracle” – because the comeback story is so impressive, so unprecedented, so unexpected.

And yet, the strange thing isn’t that one of the poorest and most under-resourced states in the country implemented this – the strange thing is that it’s so rare as to be noteworthy.

Mississippi’s turnaround story is, as most things in life, a story of cause and effect – and in this case, the causes are quite few: a scientific approach to reading, a teacher education program consistent with that scientific approach, early identification and intensive intervention for students who are struggling, and a commitment to honoring the integrity of grade level standards (if a child isn’t reading at a third grade level, they don’t get advanced to third grade).

The “scientific approach to reading” in question is – no surprise – teaching via phonics, the time-tested approach to literacy that has worked for centuries, but which modern public schools seem strangely allergic to.

The simplest headline summary of the Mississippi Miracle is that Mississippi started teaching its kids to read using phonics – and stopped advancing kids who hadn’t learned the material. Their literacy scores turned around seemingly overnight. But of course, the story is more complicated than that.

Mississippi’s comeback started all the way back in 2000, in the private sector, when corporate executive and philanthropist Jim Barksdale donated $100m to launch the Barksdale Reading Institute, a nonprofit intended to turn around Mississippi’s poor literacy rates. Barksdale, whose résumé included serving as the COO of FedEx, the CEO of AT&T, and the CEO of Netscape, was deeply committed to his home state of Mississippi and deeply concerned about the literacy rates in its schools.

He saw the literacy crisis for what it is: the deficit of a fundamental life skill, with lasting implications for the entire life trajectory of children robbed of the chance to learn to read.

As sociology professor Beth Hess wrote to The New York Times after Barksdale’s donation was announced (after praising Barksdale himself): “It is disturbing that the state of Mississippi will be rewarded for its continuing failure to tax its citizens fairly and to allocate enough money to educate students, especially in predominantly black districts. This should have been a public rather than private responsibility.”

Yet as is so often the case, it was private sector efforts that led to change, unfettered by bureaucracy and untethered from the slow-moving weight of the public sector machine.

The Barksdale Reading Institute tackled the reading crisis at every level: teaching reading instruction inside Mississippi’s teachers’ colleges, engaging with parents and early childhood programs (like Head Start), and educating teachers on teaching phonics.

In 2013, Mississippi’s public sector followed suit, implementing two critical steps: passing a law that required all third graders to pass a “reading gate” assessment to advance to fourth grade, and appointing Casey Wright as Mississippi’s superintendent of education, who in the words of journalist Holly Korbey, “reorganized the entire education department to focus on literacy and more rigorous standards.”

Under the stewardship of Wright, Mississippi trained over 19,000 of its teachers in teaching phonics using the science-backed instructional program LETRS. In the early days of the literacy push, the state focused more on teacher training than on curriculum, but in 2016 it expanded its efforts to promote the use of curricula it felt best supported literacy training.

Compared with a full curriculum overhaul, the third-grade reading gate might sound like a small change, but it’s a critically important piece of the puzzle. Across the country, grade advancement is largely treated as a product of age, not of academic ability. Students with “failing grades” can be held back (and often are), but a passing grade is a low bar: a “D,” often considered a passing grade, usually means proficiency of 60 percent, meaning a child can miss 40 percent of the third-grade material and still advance to fourth grade.

The third-grade reading assessment ensures that children aren’t advancing to harder material with large gaps in their knowledge, that they’re set up with the skills they need to succeed, rather than being thrown in the deep end to fail. It’s also an important milestone: third-grade reading proficiency is a leading indicator of long-term academic success, with poor third-grade readers far more likely to drop out of high school. And as evidenced by Mississippi’s rising math scores (even though most of its energy is being directed toward literacy), the ability to read correlates with better performance across all subjects.

All this effort, unsurprisingly, led to swift and measurable results. Not only did Mississippi come in ninth in the nation in fourth-grade reading in 2025, but it scores even higher when weighted for demographic factors like poverty.

None of this should be scientifically surprising (because obviously teaching kids to read using the scientifically backed approach was going to work). But it’s politically shocking because, despite ample research, schools across the country resist teaching students to read using phonics, and their literacy rates flounder as a result.

Other states across the South (coined by Karen Vaites as the “Southern Surge states”) have followed Mississippi’s lead. Louisiana implemented a similar reading program in tandem with Mississippi, beginning in 2012 and seeing similar results. Tennessee implemented approaches borrowing from Mississippi and Louisiana in the school year of 2018-19, and Alabama followed suit in the 2019 legislative session. Each state is seeing success in its amended reading education approach.

None of these states have ample funding; each is in the bottom half nationally for per-pupil spending. All of these states have large numbers of students below the poverty line. Some have teacher and resource shortages. And yet, by implementing a pure phonics approach to reading instruction, they’re blowing past states that have more funding and more resources but are using a less rigorous approach.

In the words of writer Kelsey Piper, “illiteracy is a policy choice.” We know that teaching reading via phonics works. We know how to do it. And, thanks to Mississippi, we know it can be effective even with a limited budget and limited staff. 

Thanks to Jim Barksdale, we know that private sector pushes toward better policy can be effective. And thanks to states using non-phonics literacy approaches (and whose test scores are falling while Mississippi’s are rising), we know what not to do, too. 

The challenge now is to stop doing what doesn’t work, and start moving toward what does – not just in Mississippi and the Southern Surge states, but all across the country.

For most of us, especially those of us who think about it a lot, the Roman Empire conjures up famous names of such men as Caesar, Augustus, Nero, Marcus Aurelius, and a few others of the imperial elite. We might also think of grand structures like the Colosseum, the Appian Way, and the Pantheon, or massive spectacles from gladiator duels to races at the Circus Maximus. Dozens of books explore the Empire’s wars against Dacia in southeastern Europe, the Iceni in Britannia, Germania in northern Europe, and the Jews in Palestine.  

The point is, we tend to think of the extraordinary, not the ordinary or, to put it another way, the macro, instead of the micro. Why? As Kim Bowes, a professor of classical archaeology at the University of Pennsylvania, explains in Surviving Rome: The Economic Lives of the Ninety Percent, until recently the ordinary lives of ordinary Romans eluded us for lack of evidence. Only in the last three or four decades, thanks to an explosion of archeological digs often triggered by construction projects across Europe, have we been showered with new knowledge about the lives of what Bowes labels “the 90 percent.”  

“It’s a delicious irony,” she writes, “that more information about the rural Roman 90 percent has emerged from the construction of Euro Disney [about 15 miles east of Paris] than from the well-intentioned excavations designed to find them.”

Perhaps we assumed that “everyday working people” in ancient Rome didn’t write much about themselves. Certainly, the well-known chroniclers of the day — Sallust, Livy and Tacitus — didn’t focus on them; they mostly wrote instead about the big names who wielded political power. But thanks to discoveries of the past four decades — including graffiti, and writings on broken pottery and wooden tablets, coins and documents and farm implements, and scientific analysis of soil samples and ancient ruins — we’ve learned more about the lives of ordinary people in the Empire than historians ever knew before. 

This “shower of information about Roman farms and fields, crops and herds, and the geology and soil science,” Bowes argues, is transforming our understanding of life at the time. Her book is the first notable effort to tell the world what these recent findings reveal. 

Let’s remember that the history of ancient Rome did not begin with the Empire. For 500 years before its first emperor, it was a remarkable res publica (a republic) known for the rule of law, substantial liberty, and the dispersion of power. When that crumbled into imperial autocracy late in the first century BCE, what we know as “the Empire” took root and lasted another 500 years. Weakened internally by its own welfare-warfare state, the Western Roman Empire centered in Rome fell to barbarians in 476 CE. Bowes’ attention is drawn exclusively to that second half-millennia.  

The Empire evolved into a very different place from the old Republic. By the dawn of the second century CE, it would have been unrecognizable to Roman citizens of the second century BCE Loyalty to the state and one-man rule had largely superseded the old republican virtues. Many emperors were ghastly megalomaniacs to whom earlier Romans would never have groveled.

Despite the general decline in morals and governance that characterized much of the imperial era, ordinary Romans fared better than you might surmise, at least until the decline overwhelmed them in the late fifth century. Bowes attributes this to “cagey managers of small resources” who lived in “precarity” but “doubled down on opportunities.” The picture she paints with recent evidence is one of hard-working, resourceful farmers, tradesmen, and shopkeepers making the very best of a tough situation and, for the most part, doing remarkably well at it. 

Ongoing excavations at Pompeii, destroyed by a volcanic eruption in 79 CE, have yielded fascinating details of commerce and coinage in the city: 

Bar and shop owners did more of their business in bronze and less with the prestige metals. Resellers of bulk oil and wine, and above all artisans producing for larger-scale markets, used gold and particularly silver. 

Bowes reveals that much of the Roman world experienced a “consumer revolution” as the Empire stretched from the border with Scotland to the Levant and across north Africa. Roman roads and trade, even while government grew more tyrannical in Rome, facilitated it. Consider this finding:

New data from archeology, and newly reconsidered texts like the Pompeii graffito, find working people, even some of the poorest, consuming far in excess of our previous expectations. From small-time traders to enslaved servants, farmers to craftsmen, Romans ate more and different foods, purchased rather than made many of the items they used…Their levels of household consumption were thus historically quite high…

The immense quantity of data gleaned from the recent discoveries shows up in numerous tables, charts, graphs and illustrations in Bowes’ book. From those entries, we learn of the accounts of a Roman beer-buyer; the percentage of farms with lamps, candlesticks and window glass; which cereal crops were grown on small farms; the real incomes of artisans and shopkeepers; the prevalence of metabolic disease among children, and so much more.  

For comedians who often poke fun today at British teeth, there’s this tidbit: Data suggest that the Roman conquest of Britain brought dramatic declines in dental health and that “British urbanites had the same or perhaps even worse dental health as the mostly urban Italian sample.” 

Nonetheless, new evidence suggests that “the majority of Romans were consuming a relatively robust caloric package.” Bowes tells us, 

This meant a lot more energy to do work, and thus a lot more work could be done. The Coliseum was not built on 1,900 calories per day…The Coliseum was not built by workers scraping their porridge out of a single pot. 

So, we now know that ordinary Romans during the Empire likely lived better than historians previously believed. They exhibited “relentless persistence and shrewdness,” “perseverance and ingenuity,” a degree of “grit and hustle” we can appreciate more than ever. For several hundred years, their accomplishment “was their ability to wrest a living from a hard and complex world.”  

We also know that it didn’t last. As the Empire disintegrated in the fifth century, it became ever more difficult for many, and impossible for a great number, to eke out a living. The “Dark Ages” that commenced with the fall of Rome saw economic and cultural decline and a massive depopulation. Life spans shortened, mortality rose, and standards of living plummeted. At its height, the city of Rome itself was home to a million people; a few centuries later, it plunged to a nadir of barely 30,000.  

Though Bowes falls short of saying so herself, I think the moral of the story is this: A resourceful people can endure a great deal before they throw in the towel, but a thriving civilization depends on what the Roman Empire ultimately forfeited: peace, freedom, property rights, and the rule of law. 

One of the most robust findings in economics is that, with few exceptions, people respond to incentives, rather than intentions or moral principles. Individuals operate under constraints of time, information, and risk, and as such, they will predictably and understandably adjust their behavior to whatever metrics ensure success. To do otherwise is irrational. When performance is evaluated and rewarded using metrics like quotas, behavior shifts toward satisfying those quotas to secure the benefits thereof. This happens in firms, schools, hospitals, police departments, and regulatory agencies, even when everyone understands, at least in the abstract, that the metric is distinct from the goals to be achieved.

Immigration enforcement provides a vivid case study of this general institutional failure mode. Under recent policy changes, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement has operated under explicit arrest targets in the form of daily and annual numerical goals meant to demonstrate enforcement intensity and resolve. The political rationale for these targets is straightforward. It is to signal to voters and political supporters that the current administration is serious about protecting the border and clamping down on illegal immigration.

But economics teaches that what gets measured gets optimized and gamed for various reasons, mostly having to do with incentives. In the case of immigration enforcement, when success is defined in numerical terms, agents will pursue the cheapest path to those numbers, rather than pursuing individuals and groups that are harder to find and detain. That is a rational given the incentives created by the Administration, namely rewarding aggressive arrest quotas. It makes sense that whenever institutions or individuals face quotas, they are likely to focus on the low-hanging fruit. Time spent achieving an easy unit of output eats up time spent pursuing a hard one. Effort that is devoted to high-risk targets, like violent criminals and well-entrenched gangs, threatens performance metrics in ways that low-risk targets do not. When failure to meet quotas carries professional consequences, agents will avoid activities that jeopardize the count, even if those activities are more closely aligned with the stated mission.

The logic is straightforward. Violent criminals, gang leaders, and professional smugglers are difficult to locate and expensive to apprehend, often relying on networks of other people to help them evade detection. Pursuing such criminal organizations requires investigations, coordination across jurisdictions, surveillance, and uncertain outcomes, making it easy for agents to come up empty-handed. By contrast, unauthorized immigrants who are otherwise law-abiding are comparatively easy to find. They have fixed residences, work regular jobs, and their children often attend the local school. Many are already interacting with the state through legal channels, including standard immigration check-ins.

When arrest quotas rise, then, it’s no surprise that arrests have accelerated disproportionately among those who are easiest to find and arrest rather than those who pose the greatest threat. Recent data confirm this pattern. Enforcement activity has surged, but the majority of arrests involve individuals without prior criminal convictions, a distribution consistent with quota-driven optimization rather than threat-based prioritization. And given the career and political incentives behind meeting those quotas, it is what we should expect. This behavior is rational given the incentives; it would be surprising if agents behaved otherwise.

There is a deeper problem here, though, that Hayek can help us diagnose. Quotas assume that central authorities know in advance how enforcement effort should be allocated across a vast and heterogeneous landscape. They assume that arrests are sufficiently homogeneous, such that merely counting them captures what matters. They assume that the marginal value of the next arrest is roughly constant across contexts. And they make these assumptions, often, without the salient local knowledge needed. 

Here the analogy to central planning becomes illuminating. Central planners, like those in Cuba or the former Soviet Union, fail because they lack access to the dispersed, tacit, and constantly changing knowledge required to allocate resources efficiently. As Hayek argued, markets work not because anyone knows the right answer in advance, but because competition allows agents to discover it through decentralized experimentation and feedback information that would otherwise be unavailable. Enforcement environments share this complexity because, among other reasons, threats vary by region, network, industry, and time. A centralized quota cannot incorporate this information, partly because it treats arrests as interchangeable units in the same way that central plans treat tons of steel or bushels of grain as interchangeable.

This helps explain why quota-driven enforcement is insensitive to conditions on the ground. It cannot adapt to local threat profiles because it does not reward adaptation. It cannot prioritize effectively because prioritization is costly and quotas reward speed, and it cannot learn from failure because in most cases it lacks the local knowledge needed for the adjustment. Of course, politicians can pivot when citizens and voters push back, but it is necessarily a less detailed and efficient process than, for example, markets and prices. 

Worse still, enforcement that deliberately and disproportionately targets working, embedded individuals produces sudden and uneven labor supply shocks. Industries that rely heavily on immigrant labor, like construction and agriculture, experience disruptions that cascade via prices, output, and complementary employment. These are downstream consequences of enforcement choices shaped by quotas. When enforcement prioritizes ease of arrest over social cost, it predictably targets workers rather than criminals, disrupting productive relationships that markets had already coordinated. The result resembles what happens when planners disrupt supply chains without understanding their internal complementarities.

A common defense of quotas appeals to accountability. Without numerical targets, agencies may underperform, selectively enforce, or drift away from their mandates. That said, the existence of a real problem, namely accountability, is hardly a defense of a flawed solution based on quotas that measure a single dimension without the necessary local knowledge.

The central lesson is rooted in institutional design and incentive structures under which these immigration agents operate. When complex, knowledge-intensive activities are governed by centralized numerical targets, agents will rationally pursue targets in ways that undermine the broader purpose of the institutional effort. Perverse incentives and poor institutional design are not the only explanatory factors here —personal choice and moral character matter, too—but they are a big part of the explanatory pie.

Prediction markets seem to be everywhere these days. Now you can bet not only on the outcomes of sporting events, but also elections, wars, and natural disasters. Yet many people react to these markets with disgust. For instance, in a recent article in Jacobin, political commentator David Moscrop calls them “demented” and “grotesque.”

The main moral objection to prediction markets seems to be that it’s wrong to profit from someone’s misfortune. And intuitively there does seem to be something immoral about raking in thousands of dollars because you correctly predicted that a hurricane would hit a particular city or a particular war would break out, resulting in tremendous amounts of suffering. As Moscrop puts it, “Bettors will hold financial stakes in particular outcomes, including some of the most heinous events imaginable. It’s a fundamentally cynical and dehumanizing turn.” But as natural as the gut-level unease with prediction markets is, we shouldn’t trust it. Prediction markets are both useful and morally benign.

Prediction markets are useful precisely because they incentivize accurate forecasting. The prospect of making or losing money gives participants a strong reason to seek out new information and to process that information in an unbiased way. Think about sports betting. When you don’t have any money on the line, you probably indulge in wishful thinking that your favorite team is going to win this week, even though they’re 14 point underdogs. But if you suddenly stood to lose $1,000 if you turn out to be wrong, you’ll quickly start to think more rationally about the team’s chances.

In short, prediction markets tend to deliver accurate forecasts for the simple reason that they reward accuracy and punish inaccuracy. And at the risk of making an obvious point, accurate forecasts are useful because people plan their lives around expectations about what the future holds. For instance, if you live in an area where a hurricane will hit or a war will start, that’s important information for you to know. It could quite literally be lifesaving. 

This point also helps explain why you shouldn’t accept the objection that prediction markets are morally bad because they enable people to profit from catastrophes. As the ethicists Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski have noted, many people routinely make money by accurately predicting bad things will happen without the use of prediction markets, and no one finds them immoral. Meteorologists make money forecasting hurricanes, epidemiologists make money forecasting disease outbreaks, political analysts make money forecasting electoral outcomes and wars, and so on.

The reason why no one thinks that these forecasters are doing something morally wrong is because, as already mentioned, accurately predicting bad events is actually beneficial; accurate predictions of bad events help people prepare for the bad events. (This should go without saying, but the fact that someone earns money by being right about something bad happening doesn’t mean they caused it or wanted it to happen.) Maybe the action of the bettor feels different than the action of the meteorologist, but morally, it’s the same. Someone who correctly predicts hurricanes and profits by getting a job with the Weather Channel “makes money from a catastrophe” just as much as someone who correctly predicts hurricanes and profits by placing bets on Kalshi.

You might worry that prediction markets incentivize what is in effect insider trading—they reward people for acting on information others don’t have. But that’s a feature, not a bug. If you see someone place a huge bet on an outcome that seems highly unlikely, that suggests that the outcome is more likely than you thought; maybe someone has inside information that makes them confident it’s going to happen. You don’t have to act on this signal, of course, but at least you have it in case you want to.

Critics of prediction markets also overlook the possibility that the money bettors earn can be used to mitigate the harms of the very disasters they predict. Suppose someone correctly predicts that a hurricane will make landfall and profits from a prediction market as a result. They now have additional resources that can be used to mitigate the suffering caused by the hurricane. They can donate to emergency relief, help fund rebuilding efforts, support local clinics, or contribute to flood mitigation projects. So if you’re concerned that a catastrophe is likely to occur, making an accurate prediction and allocating your winnings to help those harmed by the catastrophe is far more productive than simply watching it unfold.

Lastly, consider the objection that using prediction markets isn’t immoral, but self-destructive. These markets allow people to make risky bets that they might lose and, in turn, put them in serious financial straits.

Note, though, that it doesn’t follow from the fact that prediction markets enable people to take unwise financial risks that government officials should ban them. Suppose your neighbor asks you to make a large investment in her startup producing perpetual motion machines. That investment would be an unwise financial risk to say the least. Nevertheless, government officials shouldn’t intervene because you have the right to take that risk. It’s your money after all.

Prediction markets don’t cause or celebrate disasters, nor do they force people to gamble recklessly. Instead, they allow people to test their predictions in a system that rewards them for being right and penalizes them for being wrong. The result is accurate information that others can use to help plan their lives. If anything, that’s a positive moral good.

We will probably never know the true death count of the courageous Iranian revolutionaries, but what has been shared in graphic detail is the horrific brutality of the Iranian theocracy towards its own people. 

In a recent New Yorker essay, “A Massacre in Mashhad,” Cora Engelbrecht reported on one multi-day slaughter of an enormous crowd of Iranian protesters filling the streets, bridges, and highways of Mashhad. Children with their mothers and grandparents were among the dead. One Iranian sharing documentation with Engelbrecht reported, “For three nights, the streets of my hometown turned into a killing field.”

For some, the mindset that gave rise to the Iranian theocracy seems like a different world, thousands of miles away or hundreds of years ago. FA Hayek would say: don’t be so sure. 

The Iranian regime is a form of theocratic totalitarianism. Its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, says, “God speaks through my mouth.” A dissenter is considered an “enemy of God,” which justifies unimaginable brutality and lethal force against them. Foreign mercenary thugs have been brought into Iran to join forces with the IRGC to put down the revolution. They were given instructions to target the face and head of protesters, with the aim of blinding them.

America has its own growing theocratic groups. For now, their actions are tempered by American sensibilities and laws. Yet the mindset of these groups is as destructive and vicious as the Iranian theocracy.

We find one of the roots of America’s growing theocratic mindset in the writings of French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Without irony, in his chapter titled “The Legislator” from his book The Social Contract, Rousseau wrote, “In order to discover the rules of society best suited to nations, a superior intelligence beholding all the passions of men without experiencing any of them would be needed.”

Rousseau continued,

This intelligence would have to be wholly unrelated to our nature, while knowing it through and through; its happiness would have to be independent of us, and yet ready to occupy itself with ours; and lastly, it would have, in the march of time, to look forward to a distant glory, and, working in one century, to be able to enjoy in the next. 

Rousseau ended that paragraph, again without irony, “It would take gods to give men laws.”

What Rousseau envisioned would overturn the whole basis of Western civilization’s progress—trial and error and the freedom to grow beyond what doesn’t work.

In The Fatal Conceit, FA Hayek argued that a fundamental error of socialism—and this error mirrors theocratic thinking—is its attempt to impose the morality of the “small band” or “tribe” onto the “extended order of human cooperation.” 

He explained how “socialist morality would destroy much of present humankind and impoverish much of the rest.” We can observe that Americans are mostly sustained by a decentralized market, made orderly by people voluntarily cooperating with each other, yet each aiming to achieve their own ends. To replace this spontaneous order with a centralized “moral” plan would collapse the very system that produces the resources required for human survival. Khamenei has collapsed the Iranian economy primarily by directing resources to fund terror all over the world.

Socialist morality is stripped of the supernatural justifications of theocratic morality, but retains a totalitarian soul. To believe “the rules of society” can be discovered and human nature molded to suit that design is to invite a “superior” person to step in and do the molding. Millions of people supported despots like Hitler, Stalin, or the Ayatollahs, believing a “superior” person in the seat of power would create a better world. This is the fatal conceit. 

The Iranian regime believes it can design an Islamic society. Western theocrats believe they can design an equitable society, a green society, and on and on, through administrative engineering.

Hayek showed that no “superior intelligence” exists that can grasp the incalculable preferences of human beings. Hayek explains that what is responsible for the miracle of modern life is not an Ayatollah or a secular dictator but “the rules of human conduct that gradually evolved (especially those dealing with property, honesty, contract, exchange, trade, competition, gain, and privacy).” 

The rules of conduct generated under totalitarian regimes are vastly different from those generated in a liberal society. In Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek distinguishes between nomos and thesis. 

Liberty exists only under nomos—rules that tell us how to act toward one another (e.g., “don’t steal,” “don’t kill”) without telling us what we should achieve. In Hayek’s words: “The Great Society arose through the discovery that men can live together in peace and mutually benefit each other without agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue.” Only these “abstract rules… made it possible to extend the order of peace beyond the small groups pursuing the same ends.”

Theocracy operates through thesis. The Ayatollah and, for example, the DEI Dean both use rules as commands to achieve specific social outcomes (e.g., make society more Islamic or make society more equitable). 

While the IRGC uses bullets, the American administrative theocracy uses rules as its cudgel to gain compliance with its social designs. The American theocrat attempts to replace nomos with thesis. 

Hayek warned in The Road to Serfdom, “to undertake the direction of the economic life of people with widely divergent ideals and values is to assume responsibilities which commit one to the use of force.” Because it is impossible for everyone to agree on what a just outcome looks like, the state exercises arbitrary power to impose its own design.

To what extent has thesis replaced nomos in America? In the spirit of Hayek, here is a list of questions for evaluating “laws,” political policies, executive orders, or administrative mandates. When you can answer these questions in the affirmative, the law or rule fosters liberty. 

• Does this rule apply to everyone, including those who created it and those who currently hold power?
• Is the rule defined without a specific “goal” or “end” in mind? 
• Can an individual know in advance how the rule will affect them, regardless of an administrator’s whims?
• Does the rule allow individuals to pursue their own diverse ends, rather than forcing them to serve a common good?
• Does this policy assume that the government knows less than the dispersed knowledge held by the people? 
• Does the rule avoid naming specific groups (racial, religious, or economic) for special treatment?
• Does the rule focus on what people must not do (prohibitions) rather than what they must do (positive obligations)?
• Is the rule based on a long-standing tradition and “discovered” practice? (A rule crafted overnight by a committee is not a discovered practice.)
• Is the policy free of words like “social,” or “equitable” that blur the limits of power?
• Would you feel safe if your worst political enemy oversaw the enforcement of this exact rule?

Evaluate today’s rules and “laws” using these questions, and notice that many are commands to mold people to fit an engineered design.

The “superior intelligence” Rousseau sought cannot be found in a person or a bureaucratic state, but rather in the dispersed knowledge of a free people.

Whether the governing force is a religious elite or a secular bureaucracy, the outcome of a totalitarian soul is a collapse of the very civilization required for human survival.

The list of Trump administration foreign-policy moves in recent weeks is long. It conducted an attack on Venezuela, brought President Nicolas Madura and his wife Cilia Flores to stand trial in New York for illegal drug smuggling and secured sway over massive petroleum reserves. Along with this far-reaching action, Trump pursued control of Greenland “one way or another” and said that Cubans should prepare for collapse, Colombia and Mexico should tread lightly and Iran should expect “very strong action” if protestors there are executed.

Asked in an interview if there were any constraints limiting what he might do on the world stage, Trump replied: “Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.” He added “I don’t need international law. I’m not looking to hurt people.”

Some Trump critics — no matter how shocked or opposed to his actions they are— may be welcoming the thought that he, like most of the rest of us, is thinking about conscience and how it affects behavior. By no means does this ensure peaceful outcomes, but it’s not unreasonable to think that it makes those outcomes more likely.

Conscience is a virtue; acting on it is also a tool of self-interest. As moral philosopher and economist Adam Smith proposed in his 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments, we are each equipped with an “impartial spectator” — a “man within the breast” — who observes and affects our actions. Smith argued implicitly that this helps form an invisible hand, similar to that of the free market, which enables self-interested people to become more moral creatures.

The mental process Smith described, similar to what Sigmund Freud termed the “super ego,” chastens what might otherwise be driven by greed, jealousy, an insatiable desire for power and other less divine appetites. Smith’s spectator develops from social interactions that result from the human tendency to desire respect, welcome the larger community’s praise and, for politicians, to keep their base aligned. These form habits of the heart that lead us toward long-term gains in social settings.

Smith more famously explained how self-interest enables the most efficient allocation of society’s resources. Describing human action in a world where force and coercion are not an option, he remarked that it was not from “the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” as they earn customers through superior products and pricing.

When there is competition (or even the threat of competition) in our commercial dealings, each person’s self-interest balanced against that of others can have a positive effect on overall human wellbeing; indeed, it’s a necessary part of freedom’s machinery that delivers a happy outcome.

But what about the world of international politics, where force and coercion are part of the equation? Can the competing self-interests of surging and receding world leaders still lead to a balance that serves the whole? Can such a process be chastened by the “man within the breast”?

Trump’s deputy chief of staff, Stephen Miller, suggests that this is no time to rely on “niceties” to do the right thing: “We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time.”

As certain as Miller sounds, there is another reality to acknowledge: competition has its role to play. Yes, the United States has the power to forcibly remove a leader in Venezuela and to secure a different relationship with Greenland. But we are not the only game in town to partner with. There are other world powers — small and large — which have something to offer these nations, and to us for that matter.

We are seeing this competition unfold now as Canada signals an end to a long-term special U.S. friendship and discusses trade deals with India and China. We see it as Denmark moves to strengthen NATO after enduring the president’s threats to take over Greenland.

Though there are many things at play, the incentive still exists for powerful nations and their leaders to heed the impartial spectator, encourage trade and seek a more harmonious world.