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For more than a century, America’s stock listings have been dominated by two addresses: Wall Street’s New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq’s MarketSite in Times Square. That may soon change. On September 30, 2025, the US Securities and Exchange Commission approved the Texas Stock Exchange (TXSE) to operate as a national securities exchange.

Headquartered in Dallas and backed by major financial institutions, TXSE plans to begin trading in early 2026 — marking the first serious challenge in decades to the entrenched exchange duopoly and opening a new chapter for American capital markets.

Texas offers both symbolism and substance for such an endeavor. With roughly $2.7 trillion in annual economic output, the state represents about one-tenth of the entire US economy. It is home to more than a tenth of the nation’s publicly listed companies, and its mix of rapid growth, favorable taxes, and business-friendly regulation makes it a natural candidate for a financial hub. The creation of a new national exchange in Dallas isn’t just a regional milestone — it’s a sign that financial innovation is no longer bound to Manhattan’s geography or culture.

The Texas Stock Exchange aims to reintroduce competition into a sector that has grown listless and increasingly consolidated. It’s undoubtedly true that the existing exchanges have played a crucial role in maintaining transparency and corporate accountability; their listing standards have strengthened governance and investor protections. Yet those same regulatory frameworks have also drifted into areas far removed from financial performance. In recent years, both the NYSE and Nasdaq have woven social and political priorities — what critics describe as wokeness — into disclosure and board-composition rules. They are costly distractions from capital formation. The TXSE proposes a more neutral approach: maintaining high financial and ethical standards while allowing firms to focus on profitability, innovation, and shareholder value.

What distinguishes the TXSE is not a break from federal oversight — the SEC will supervise it under the same 1934 Exchange Act framework — but a fresh philosophy of exchange governance. Its listing rules, approved by the SEC in late 2025, emphasize issuer friendliness without relaxing quantitative standards. Companies may request confidential pre-application eligibility reviews at no cost, an innovation that can save months of uncertainty and advisory fees. The exchange also plans lower recurring costs and streamlined compliance obligations, designed to appeal especially to midsize and emerging-growth firms that find New York’s red tape prohibitive. For issuers, the advantages are procedural rather than ideological: less bureaucracy, clearer guidance, and faster time to market — all within the same legal protections that govern other national exchanges.

Importantly, the TXSE is not creating a parallel arbitration or mediation framework distinct from existing US securities law. Disputes will remain under conventional regulatory and judicial channels. What TXSE offers instead is predictability and professional competence — a governance regime grounded in financial expertise rather than social activism or politicized mandates. Texas’s recent corporate-law reforms, offering expanded safe harbors for directors and officers of Texas-based or TXSE-listed corporations, further reinforce that business-friendly environment.

Publicly traded companies are not abstract entities — they are the backbone of the US economy. Collectively, they employ roughly 28 million Americans, investing hundreds of billions each year in facilities, equipment, research, and expansion. Publicly traded paper also allows firms that might not be cash-rich to acquire or merge with others, achieving efficiencies of scale, spreading innovation faster, and delivering better and more affordable products and services to consumers. When those firms can operate and raise capital efficiently, the benefits ripple widely through communities and households alike.

If successful, the TXSE’s impact may reach far beyond the companies it lists. A dynamic marketplace disciplines incumbents: the very existence of a new exchange could push legacy venues to innovate, lower costs, and revisit how they define “best practices.” As competition increases, issuers may find not only a cheaper but also a fairer playing field — one where governance expectations are tied to financial prudence rather than fashionable politics.

Building an exchange is no small task. To achieve price discovery, a critical mass of liquidity is necessary, and accumulating that liquidity depends on both performance and confidence. The NYSE, Nasdaq, and other market centers have deep, long-established pools of trading activity that reinforce their dominance. For TXSE to thrive, it must persuade a broad array of market participants — from investment banks and hedge funds to retail brokerages and pension funds — that Dallas can host a market as vibrant and reliable as New York’s. (JP Morgan has already asserted its view on that matter.) That will require trust, technological strength, and seamless integration with the national trading network.

Yet Texas’s position is unusually strong. Its economy is vast and diversified; its infrastructure modern; its talent base deep in both finance and energy technology. A more geographically diverse system of exchanges spreads operational risk, encourages regional specialization, and gives investors and entrepreneurs alternatives to the cultural and regulatory monolith that New York has become. TXSE’s lower listing costs, emphasis on issuer engagement, and alignment with Texas’s pro-business climate make it the most credible new exchange entrant in generations.

To the uninitiated observer, another stock exchange might sound redundant, or more cynically like another gaming venue for the wealthy. The current US President, in fact, once expressed the view that the New York Stock Exchange is “the biggest casino in the world.” 

In truth, exchanges are the plumbing of capitalism — the place where savings become investment and new industries find their footing. By one account, Ludwig von Mises once commented that stock exchanges are ultimately the dividing line between market and collectivist economic systems. Murray Rothbard recounted (“Making Economic Sense”):

One time I asked Professor von Mises, the great expert on the economics of socialism, at what point on this spectrum of statism would he designate a country as “socialist” or not. At that time, I wasn’t sure that any definite criterion existed to make that sort of clear-cut judgment. And so I was pleasantly surprised at the clarity and decisiveness of Mises’s answer. “A stock market,” he answered promptly. A stock market is crucial to the existence of capitalism and private property. For it means that there is a functioning market in the exchange of private titles to the means of production. There can be no genuine private ownership of capital without a stock market: there can be no true socialism if such a market is allowed to exist.

A more competitive and decentralized exchange system strengthens that foundation and keeps commercial blood flowing through the country’s economic arteries.

Despite socialistic structural rigidities, changes are coming to US financial markets, albeit slowly. With its regulatory green light secured, and trading expected to begin in early 2026, the Texas Stock Exchange represents more than a new address for American capital markets. It is a bet on openness, competition, and the belief that — just as in the marketplace for ideas — the market for capital works best when it is competitive and free.

With SNAP funding in the news, we’re seeing a revival of a familiar complaint against big business. The reason millions of Americans need public benefits like SNAP, critics say, is that their employers don’t pay them enough.

As one columnist recently put it, corporations “have taken advantage of Medicaid, food stamps, and other safety net programs for years to get out of paying their workers a living wage by sticking the taxpayers with the expense.” These corporations are to blame for people’s need for public assistance, and they should pay their workers more so that they’ll rely less on safety net programs funded by taxpayers. 

But this complaint is morally confused. To see why, let’s start with a simple point: an employer is a buyer of labor. So when critics say that big corporations should raise their employees’ wages to the point where they don’t need public assistance, what they’re really saying is that corporations should pay more for what they buy. But we shouldn’t assume that merely buying something from someone obligates you to pay them so much that they never need public assistance, rather than simply paying them the mutually agreeable price. 

Here’s an analogy. Scarlett likes to buy scarves from Wes on eBay. Whenever Wes lists a scarf for auction, Scarlett makes the highest bid. In short, she’s his best customer. But times get tough for Wes. He begins to struggle to pay rent and buy groceries. Scarlett keeps winning the auctions for Wes’s scarves and sending payments his way, but it’s not enough to keep him off SNAP.

Politicians and commentators learn about Wes’s situation and place the blame squarely on one person: Scarlett.

If only she had paid more than the auction price for his scarves, they argue, Wes wouldn’t need SNAP benefits. According to one columnist, “Scarlett is taking advantage of the government’s safety net to get out of paying Wes enough to live on and sticking taxpayers with the expense.” 

The moral condemnation of Scarlett would be downright bizarre, and it’s not hard to see why. Remember, Scarlett is Wes’s best customer — she offers more for his scarves than anyone else. If anything, we should have the least complaint against her. She’s already given Wes thousands of dollars while other customers have given him less or nothing at all. Scarlett is doing more than anyone else to benefit Wes, so it’s strange to single her out for blame. 

Now turn back to big businesses like Walmart and Amazon. Just as Scarlett is Wes’s best customer, so too is Walmart its employees’ best customer — that is, it made them the best offer for their labor.

We know this because if Walmart hadn’t made them the best offer, those employees would be working somewhere else instead. Workers accept the best offer for their labor just as weavers accept the best offer for their scarves. So, as with Scarlett, we should have the least complaint against Walmart, not the most. Other employers either made Walmart workers worse offers or made them no offer at all. Since Walmart is doing more than anyone else to benefit Walmart workers, it’s strange to single it out for blame. 

You might reply that I’m overthinking things. The simple truth is that Walmart should pay its employees more because it can afford to pay them more. But this view assumes you’re obligated to pay more for something simply because you can afford to do so — and that’s a dubious assumption. 

Think back to Scarlett. Suppose that she could afford to pay Wes more for his scarf than what turned out to be the winning bid. While it might be generous of her to do so, that seems more like charity than fulfilling an obligation. When someone sells you a scarf, a cup of coffee, a gym membership, or an hour of labor, you don’t thereby incur a duty to pay them whatever it takes to fix their personal finances. You simply owe them the agreed-upon price. 

And that agreed-upon price isn’t arbitrary — it reflects supply and demand in the case of labor just as it does for anything else. A scarf sells at a price where someone is willing to buy it and someone else is willing to let it go. Labor is no different: wages settle where workers are willing to offer their time and employers are willing to buy it. If the wage is set too high, people will be less likely to hire workers; if it’s too low, people will be less likely to work.

Even if you insist that rich customers like Scarlett do have a moral obligation to pay Wes more for his scarves, it doesn’t follow that government officials should force her to do so. The mere fact that you should do something — be it paying more for a scarf, driving a good friend to the airport, or visiting your sick sibling in the hospital — doesn’t establish that it’s the government’s job to make you do it. Plus, forcing Wes to raise his prices would likely backfire: if the government required Scarlett and other customers to pay more for his scarves, they’d be less likely to buy them, leaving Wes even worse off than before. 

The parallel to employers is clear. Even if you think that buyers of labor should pay more if they can afford to do so, it doesn’t follow that the state should make them. And here again, the proposed policy would probably backfire: by making workers costlier to hire, it would discourage employers from buying their labor at all — leaving them not with higher wages, but with no job. At the bare minimum, we should ensure that any policy intended to benefit workers doesn’t harm the very people it aims to help. 

America is on the cusp of the biggest power-hungry decade in a generation. Federal forecasters expect record electricity demand in 2025–26, even as oil producers are carefully managing output. Yet the main reason your bill is climbing isn’t just regional differences, it’s rules. A thicket of tariffs on essential hardware, marathon permitting timelines, and clogged grid interconnection queues layer a “policy premium” onto every kilowatt-hour. In a textbook supply-and-demand sense, demand is racing ahead, driven by AI data centers and electrification, while policy squeezes supply. Worse, Washington keeps “choosing” technologies, inviting regulatory capture and raising costs for everyone. If we want the AI era to benefit households instead of draining their wallets, we need neutral, pro-entry rules that let the cheapest reliable electrons win. 

Energy inflation tells the tale. Headline prices are running hotter than the 2 percent target, and the pressure points are concentrated in utilities. Electricity alone is up roughly 5 percent, and utility gas is up close to 12 percent versus a year ago. Average retail electricity prices have jumped nearly 9 percent already this year. The burden isn’t uniform. North Dakotans pay the lower energy costs, around 11.7¢ per kWh with a typical bill near $112, while Hawaiians pay roughly 42.3¢ and a $203 monthly tab. That gulf largely reflects system design and policy. North Dakota sits on abundant generation with strong ties to the Midcontinent grid; Hawaii is an islanded system importing fuel and equipment with layers of costs. When transmission is constrained and hardware is expensive, consumers pay.

Energy demand is taking off, mainly driven by data centers powering AI. Data-center electricity use tripled over the last decade to roughly 176 terawatt-hours, and federal analysts expect it to double, or even triple, again by 2028. That would take data centers from roughly 4.4 percent of US electricity consumption to something like 10–12 percent in just a few years. In markets with heavy data-center clustering, wholesale prices near key nodes have surged, reportedly doubling or tripling compared with five years ago, and those spikes bleed into retail rates. The largest campuses are now measured in hundreds of acres; Meta’s complex in Prineville, Oregon, covers well over a hundred. None of this is a problem if supply can scale. But supply is boxed in. 

Start with trade policy. The grid is steel, copper, aluminum, power electronics, batteries, transformers, inverters, and miles of conductor, exactly the things Washington keeps taxing. Many power-sector inputs now carry duties in the 25–50 percent range. The administration has announced additional tariffs on medium and heavy trucks, which will raise logistics costs across energy supply chains. For oil and gas, the exemption record is mixed: while crude itself may avoid new levies, drillers and midstream firms still buy tariffed inputs — steel casing, line pipe, valves — magnifying project costs. Steel and aluminum duties, recently doubled to 50 percent in some cases, raise the price of everything from rigs to transmission towers. On the “green” side, tariff policy is even more tangled. Grid-scale batteries face total duty stacks approaching the mid-sixties percent; aluminum and derivative products also pay 25 percent. Solar modules and cells still sit under safeguard tariffs near the mid-teens, layered atop other levies. The result is not a level playing field but a politicized one where lobbyists fight to be a “protected” winner and consumers lose either way. 

Then there’s the permitting time tax. Big energy projects routinely wait six or more years for approvals; some major transmission lines have been in limbo for more than a decade. Meanwhile, the grid clogs and aging infrastructure strains. Transmission congestion alone added roughly $11.5 billion to customer bills last year. Lengthy reviews no longer deliver meaningfully cleaner or safer outcomes; they mostly deliver uncertainty, which raises financing costs and deters entrants. In economics, that’s classic deadweight loss. 

Interconnection is the third vice. You can’t sell power until a grid operator studies how your plant will affect the system. For years, independent system operators and regional transmission organizations have been drowning in applications, many of them speculative. Backlogs keep new capacity — renewables, nuclear uprates, even industrial cogeneration — from plugging in. Regulators have introduced helpful reforms: “cluster studies” that analyze groups of projects at once and “readiness screens” to ensure entrants have site control and basic financing before staff spends months modeling them. But adoption is uneven. Markets like the California Independent System Operator are making headway with annual intake cycles and clearer milestones; others are still stuck, creating a patchwork of rules that adds friction and encourages forum shopping. Even good projects die on the vine if siting processes collide with wildlife, historic-preservation, and local zoning rules that were never designed for 21st-century energy density. 

Why do we tolerate all this? Because we keep trying to direct outcomes, favoring particular fuels, geographies, or industrial constituencies, rather than setting simple, technology-neutral rules. That invites regulatory capture. When agencies tilt toward the loudest incumbent or the trendiest technology, they’re not discovering the lowest-cost path to reliability; they’re rationing permits and tax credits. Households and factories pay the markup. 

What would a pro-consumer pro-technology agenda look like? 

First, stop playing favorites. Drop the tariff thicket on intermediate goods central to generation, storage, and transmission. Don’t carve out oil-and-gas inputs but punish solar or vice versa; end the game entirely. Let firms source the cheapest safe equipment globally and let market competition decide the mix of resources. When inputs get cheaper, so do bills. 

Second, rebuild permitting around shot-clocks, not calendars. Establish firm timelines and a single lead agency for major projects; if the clock runs out, move to a decision on the record. Focus intensive reviews on genuinely high-impact projects and allow routine, low-impact work, like reconductoring existing lines or swapping transformers, to proceed quickly under programmatic approvals. Provide judicial review, but time-limit it to curb endless litigation. 

Third, finish the interconnection fix. Make cluster studies and readiness requirements universal, but tune them so they screen out pure speculation without blocking smaller independent power producers. Publish transparent cost-allocation rules so developers can plan. Align interconnection with long-range transmission planning so we’re not endlessly studying plants for a grid that doesn’t exist yet. 

Fourth, open the door to firm, zero-carbon baseload. Small modular reactors and advanced designs, including molten-salt and thorium-based concepts, should compete on their merits. That means modern licensing that evaluates designs by efficiency and productivity, not lineage; standardized approvals for repeat builds; and clarity on waste handling. Clear the obstacles so private capital can try thorium-powered nuclear. If it can deliver reliable power at scale, the market will adopt it. If not, resources will flow elsewhere. Either way, consumers win. 

Finally, remember why we’re doing this. AI is a once-in-a-century general-purpose technology. It can raise productivity and living standards, but only if the power system scales without crippling costs.  

We don’t need another round of picking winners and losers on the energy front. We need to remove the artificial barriers that make supplying power slow and expensive. Cut the policy premium, tariffs that pad equipment costs, permits that drag on for years, interconnection rules that reward queue gaming, and America’s engineers, utilities, and entrepreneurs will do the rest. The cheapest reliable kilowatt-hour is the one that’s allowed to be built.

In recent decades, and especially since the release of OpenAI’s large language model ChatGPT in 2022, artificial intelligence use has rapidly spread into almost every industry. And as AI proliferates, so do fears that a wave of mass unemployment will follow. Concerns are widespread that AI will be deployed to accomplish an ever-greater share of the labor needed throughout the economy, leaving fewer and fewer jobs available for human workers.

This fear led Dario Amodei, one of the world’s leading AI technologists, to sound the alarm earlier this year about an impending “white-collar bloodbath.” The Anthropic CEO told Axios that one very possible scenario within the next one to five years is that, “Cancer is cured, the economy grows at 10 percent a year, the budget is balanced — and 20 percent of people don’t have jobs.”

This was predictably latched onto by economic interventionists, such as US Senator Bernie Sanders. “We must demand that increased worker productivity from AI benefits working people, not just wealthy stockholders on Wall St,” Sanders posted on X in response to Amodei’s statement. Sanders later posted that, “With the explosion of AI, new technology and increased worker productivity, we should demand a shorter work week, increased life expectancy and a decent standard of living for all.” Other politicians have gone even further since then. US Senator Josh Hawley, like Tucker Carlson started advocating years ago, supports banning self-driving cars to protect the jobs of car and truck drivers.

Indeed, AI has already created countless efficiencies and new capabilities throughout the economy that have made specific jobs redundant. Consider the global herbicide industry. A Bloomberg article titled “AI-Powered Weed-Killing Robots Threaten a $37 Billion Market” explains:

After almost a century of deploying a more-is-more approach to chemical herbicides, the global agricultural sector is rapidly rolling out advancements that promise to curb the use of weed-control sprays by as much as 90 percent. Using artificial-intelligence powered cameras, the new sprayers can identify and target invasive plants while avoiding the cash crops. If even a fraction of growers adopt the new tools, it could mean a big shift for crop-chemical majors like Bayer AG and BASF SE.

This potential tenfold improvement in herbicide use efficiency may significantly reduce the agricultural demand for herbicide production, and thus put many people out of their jobs in that industry. And this is just one example. From facilitating new scientific research methods, to transforming solar cell production, to improving healthcare safety, to proliferating self-driving car use, AI offers new ways of doing things throughout every industry, which devalues some skillsets in the job market and rewards others.

However, there is an opposite fear as well. Last month, during a press conference the day he won the 2025 Nobel Prize in economics, Joel Mokyr gave a speech about the grand sweep of economic history. Toward the end of his lecture he weighed in on the AI job loss debate: “As I see it, the main concern about the labor market is not technological unemployment. It’s labor scarcity.”

Mokyr is an economic historian who is renowned for looking at the big picture. And when you do that, it is clear that technological unemployment is nowhere near as big a concern as the set of problems that AI will help solve if politicians like Bernie Sanders and Josh Hawley don’t succeed in debilitating it.

Specific jobs becoming obsolete is only one side of the coin of technology’s effect on employment. The other side of the coin reveals why artificial intelligence will lead to no overall reduction in employment opportunities. Like all prior technological revolutions, AI will create at least as many jobs as it eliminates, and most importantly, the new jobs will tend to be preferable to and easier to find than the old jobs.

Unemployment rates have remained relatively constant and quite low in recent decades, currently standing at about 4.3 percent in the US and 4.9 percent across the globe, according to recent estimates. This is approximately as low as they have ever been.

Meanwhile, ever since the industrial revolution, there has been an explosion of technological advancement and proliferation that has almost completely transformed all economic industries and everyday life across the globe.

Virtually every instance of technological progress reduces the need to employ some specific form of labor. Dish washing machines have meant that homes and restaurants need only employ a small fraction of the cleaning staff that was once required per meal served. Refrigeration has conserved countless labor hours preserving foods. Electric power has exponentiated the manufacturing capability of each factory worker by enabling a new class of machinery. And the list goes on and on.

The constantly low unemployment rate, in light of recent history’s technological progress, would amaze the Industrial-Revolution-era activist group known as the Luddites, a radical labor movement of anti-technologists who rioted and destroyed factory machinery to protect their jobs from automation in the early 19th-century. Their initial concern was for the jobs of craftsmen competing with mechanized looms and knitting equipment that allowed a single worker to produce the output of a hundred craftsmen. But the scope of Luddite animosity quickly widened to oppose industrialization generally.

The nineteenth-century Luddites made the same mistake, known to economists as the “lump of labor fallacy,” that antagonists of AI are making today. In a New York Times article titled “Trump, Immigration and the Lump of Labor Fallacy,” Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman explains the fallacy: “This is the view that there is a fixed amount of work to be done and that if someone or something — some group of workers or some kind of machine — is doing some of that work, that means fewer jobs for everyone else.”

Krugman also explains why this “lump of labor” view is false:

When incomes rise, people will find something to spend their money on, creating jobs for workers displaced by technology or newcomers to the work force. Machines do, in fact, perform many tasks that used to require people; output per worker is more than four times what it was [in 1952], so we could produce 1952’s level of output with only a quarter as many workers. In fact, however, employment has tripled. … No, AI and automation, for all the changes they may bring, won’t ultimately take away jobs, and neither will immigrants.

The point about “incomes rising” is key, because it is a predictable consequence of technological automation and it is also the reason, along with new forms of work created by new technologies, why the newly created jobs will tend to be preferable to the old jobs.

Workers will only be displaced by technology if the technology is capable of producing more valuable output, meaning some net-positive combination of cheaper and higher quality, than human labor. Otherwise, mechanization won’t be profitable and employers will stick to employing humans. Therefore, we can safely bet that wherever AI is displacing human workers, consumers are benefitting from some net-positive combination of falling prices and rising quality. This means that consumers will have more income left to spend, and will therefore consume an ever-wider range of goods and services, thus funding more and more niche forms of employment that replace the jobs lost to technological improvements in the production process.

This is crystal clear if you look at the history of labor specialization. Since the mid 19th century, agriculture has gone from employing about 70 percent of US workers to employing only 2 percent. Meanwhile, the productivity of US agriculture has massively increased due to improved farming technology and food has become about 10 times more affordable for blue-collar workers in the last century.



If no new jobs had been created in America since 1840, this process would have left 68 percent of the population permanently out of work. But to the contrary, the modern economy is composed largely of jobs that people in any prior century probably never even imagined. Web designers, pet therapists, dietitians, travel agents, nail technicians, cosmetic surgeons, neuroscientists, and countless others are employed in now-common forms of labor that would have seemed either laughably frivolous or entirely unimaginable just a century ago. “Really, therapy for my dog while my children are starving?”

For a detailed description of one of the most recent and frivolous new industries imaginable, read the article titled “Does Your Plant Need a Nanny? A new crop of caretakers will spritz, polish and prune your houseplants — and even send photos while you’re away.” published by the New York Times in April. These new “plant nannies” offer virtual plant visits, and services such as speaking to, lighting, and photographing plants while their owners are away, in addition to traditional plant maintenance practices.

New and ever-more-niche and personalized forms of work are constantly made possible by the vast abundance of labor and consumption freed up by labor-saving technology. Monotonous or backbreaking tasks are left to machines while humans are freed to invent new tasks to pay each other for with all the wealth that technological efficiencies have saved or created for them.

As amazing as the present is compared to the past, the future can be an even more extreme improvement. If AI proves powerful enough to continuously transform the macroeconomy as the fearmongers predict, and so do I, this will mean such massive productivity gains that machines will eventually be running the farms and factories at almost no cost. This will render necessities more and more affordable until almost every worker can engage in more niche artforms, services, and research areas than employ almost anyone full-time in today’s economy. In addition, whole new realms of technological possibility can be unlocked, in outer space, the Metaverse, and elsewhere.

It is hard to imagine ever reaching a logical conclusion of this process, at which artificial intelligence is better than human labor for literally every purpose. That would even involve convincing those who prefer some services to have a “human touch” for sentimental, aesthetic, philosophical, or spiritual reasons that human labor is unhelpful even to them. If AI does get that powerful, that will be an end of material scarcity in which everything is free and worrying about “unemployment” will make no sense at all.

Instead of worrying about that hypothetical utopia of widespread godlike agency and infinite abundance, let’s focus on reducing human drudgery and increasing material wealth by proliferating artificial intelligence and other technological progress in the here and now.

About a year ago, I was in a room full of financial professionals explaining how the corporate engagement firm I work for, Bowyer Research, is dialoguing with Apple on the issue of child safety. Discussing the best ways to combat online child sex abuse material (CSAM) is not a fun story. As I explained the reality of Apple’s CSAM problem, in a room largely made up of Apple users, I saw a lot of concerned expressions and awkward glances at iPhones on conference tables. It’s an understandable reaction. But it drives home the point that those of us in this industry wake up every day trying to make— and I said as much.

Child exploitation is what predators do with their iPhones. Stopping child exploitation is what we’re doing with *our* iPhones.

Let me back up. My day job, corporate engagement, involves helping shareholders of companies like Apple use their financial influence to have conversations about issues at the world’s biggest brands. Oftentimes, these conversations surround corporate politicization, ESG, DEI, and the like. But, during the past two years, we’ve been having conversations at Apple about something more bipartisan: stopping the distribution of child sex abuse material.

It’s a conversation that needs to happen. The company that gave us the iPhone has driven some of the most successful and recognizable innovations in the modern world. But Apple has also staked out a definite position in the privacy-versus-oversight debate. Those incredibly high-profile privacy commitments are ingrained into the company’s ethos, and it’s for that reason that engaging them on the issue of online child safety has been such a complicated endeavor. Despite Apple’s commitments to human rights and its stated belief that “business can and should be a force for good,” the company’s been facing down a massive CSAM distribution issue. Apple recently was the subject of a $1.2 billion class action lawsuit, with victims of child sex abuse alleging that the company didn’t appropriately address videos of their abuse being distributed on platforms such as iMessage. Apple notably rolled back a planned anti-CSAM technology called NeuralHash in 2022 over privacy concerns, sparking criticism from child safety organizations.

It’s not that the technology didn’t exist, but that Apple decided the cost-benefit analysis wasn’t in its favor. That decision, right or wrong, has had real-world consequences, including significant legal liability for Apple. Investors are therefore right to ask how the company arrived at the decision to roll back the software.

This isn’t merely a moral point but an economic one (and in an aspirationally free and virtuous society, those two are connected). It was time for shareholders to get involved. Last year, Bowyer Research filed a shareholder proposal at Apple on behalf of American Family Association, an Apple investor, asking the company to publicly report the costs and benefits of not deploying anti-CSAM software. The proposal received enough shareholder support for us to bring it back this year. More importantly, it gained us several productive discussions with the company to discuss child safety.

We’d all do well to remember that the issues and decisions facing America’s biggest companies are not merely issues to be opined about by external nonprofits, NGOs, and pundits (although countless admirable, constructive examples of such entities exist). They were investor-to-company discussions. 

Shareholders, the individuals and institutions who own Apple and are literally bought into its business model and responsibility for continued success, deserve a larger and more serious role in that discussion. In a properly functioning company with a fiduciary duty to its investors, CEOs work for boards, and boards for shareholders. Investors, whose continued returns depend on companies making the right decisions, absolutely have something to say about controversial issues that those companies must navigate. Apple’s choices on combating online child abuse are no different.

And those discussions yielded results. After two years of constructive engagement from the American Family Association, along with increased legislative scrutiny regarding age protections from red states like Utah and Texas, Apple adopted changes to its child safety protocols: restrictions on underage users viewing adult-rated apps in its App Store and stringent explicit content filtering for underage users on iMessage.

This is a major win. Not just for investors, but for the almost 90 percent of teens who reportedly own iPhones. It’s a big step in the right direction to make sure that online predators have fewer tools to abuse children online. And it’s an indicator of yet another point that those of us in the corporate engagement world wake up every day to defend: genuine shareholder advocacy creates real impact.

For a long time, people have defended the idea that the best approach to values-based investing is screening out any problematic stocks from a portfolio (common categories are defense stocks, energy companies that prioritize fossil fuels, and the like). But right now, results we’re seeing at the world’s most valuable brand indicate there’s a more impactful approach than screening.

When you screen a company out of your portfolio, you give up your leverage with that company, bringing your investor influence to zero. But when you use your investor influence to dialogue about the issues that impact the companies you own (and therefore, impact your future), you are maximizing your investor influence. It’s not just Apple — we’re seeing results at companies across sectors, from viewpoint protections at JPMorgan Chase to depoliticized corporate policies at tech giants like IBM. Shareholder advocacy like the American Family Association’s gets discussions, builds relationships, and creates genuine change.

Too often, we talk about fixing businesses as if companies can only ever choose between doing the morally correct thing or making money. This is false framing. When it comes to child safety, Apple is making the right move not only for its youngest and most vulnerable users but for the investors who depend on its continued success for their financial future. And we’re right to celebrate that as a win for the shareholder advocacy model. This isn’t a moment to lean out and divest.

Democratic Socialism, at least recently, is a growth brand. According to The Nation, between 2016 and 2020 membership in the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) grew from 6,000 to over 90,000. And an article at reformandrevolution.org — the website of a “revolutionary Marxist caucus” of the DSA — claimed that after the 2024 presidential election the DSA experienced “a 5-6 times increase in new recruits.” 

The group’s political success also impresses. Nationally prominent politicians such as Rashida Tlaib and Zohran Mamdani are formal members. Others, such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie Sanders, self-identify as democratic socialists. 

Hoping to understand the brand’s cachet, and how long its growth may last, one night I dropped down the DSA rabbit hole to experience it for myself. Several videos from the 2025 national convention, which took place in Chicago in early August, are available on YouTube. 

A roundtable discussion titled “The Left and The Family” first caught my eye. Onstage, four women wearing facemasks led the discussion. They seemed despondent at the state of the US under Trump. 

“We are in an extremely reactionary moment. We are in a fascist moment,” one said, before introducing the idea of “family abolition.” There followed some soul-searching about what this term means. The panelists were not against familial relationships per se, but rather against the “white patriarchal” nuclear family as a foundation of society. 

The conversation wound between ideas both defensible (“it’s a myth that there is one mother to any of us,”) and absurd (child protective services exist to channel children into prison so they can serve as cheap labor for capitalists). Overall, sentiment favored a future in which interpersonal life will have less to do with family and more to do with the collective.  

To me, it didn’t sound like a future to relish. And given the DSA’s meteoric rise to relevance, the room overall seemed to be light on joie de vivre. Had newly elected New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani been present, his persistently earnest smile might have leavened the vibe a bit. 

Or maybe I just needed something more remedial to help get my head around the DSA mindset. An older video offered a slideshow on basic socialism narrated by the DSA’s national co-chair, Megan Romer. It was candid, enlightening, and reasonably upbeat. My first light-bulb moment came when Romer explained how becoming a socialist is not typically an involved intellectual process. 

“Most people become socialist because of one issue,” Romer said. “They usually become socialists because of something they specifically got mad about in the news. That is the primary thing that makes people become a socialist.” 

It struck me as odd. I don’t recall anger playing a big role in my support for capitalism, other than maybe learning the plight of independent thinkers in places like the Soviet Union or Maoist China. 

Being an economics major in college, there was also an intellectual aspect to my worldview. It formed slowly as I gained insight into the beneficial organizing power of free markets. Capitalism may not create social utopias, but at least it generates the greatest level of economic wealth in human history. 

The slideshow continued with an explanation of Marxism. The highlight was a slide with a laid-back-looking Karl Marx in a convertible (something capitalist economies have likely produced far better than communist). “Get in loser,” the caption read; “We’re seizing the means of production.” 

From there, the presentation bogged down in industrial-age tropes of leisurely, cigar-chomping capitalists, whom Romer termed “bosses,” and their exploited proletariat workforce. Two centuries after Marx, socialism has trouble reckoning with capitalism’s social mobility and its expansion and empowerment of the middle class.  

Though I don’t consider myself a proletarian, I’ve had many bosses in my career, some better than others. But the truth is that most worked longer hours than I did. And almost all had more experience than me. This probably explains why their paychecks were bigger than mine. Socialism, however, is a narrative that needs a cartoonish villain, and the capitalist overlord oppressing underlings provides it.  

In the end, I came out of the DSA rabbit hole unswayed to socialism. But maybe winning arguments isn’t the group’s main goal. My second lightbulb moment had come when Romer informed the audience that they should not expect socialism to gain power through a contest of ideas. 

“Power only cedes itself to a greater degree of power,” she said. “We win by making conditions so intolerable for the ruling class that they would rather give in to our demands than continue to live with the disturbance we cause, until we are able to fully seize power ourselves.” 

There is an old saying that those who are not communist before age 30 have no heart, and those who are still communist after age 30 have no brain. The heart is not only the seat of affection but of anger, something few people had more of than Karl Marx. From what I saw, modern democratic socialists are carrying his legacy forward with hearts that have moved from anger to a desire for control. In the end, seizing the means of production requires control of not only private businesses, natural resources, and factories, but human bodies and minds. It’s a road many nations have gone down with tragic results. Let’s hope the US isn’t next. 

Social media has been discussing Fannie Mae’s announcement that the organization will no longer require a minimum credit score of 620 for mortgages. Is this a big deal?

Likely not. Freddie Mac has already dropped its minimum credit score requirement. These requirements applied to the automated underwriting process for mortgages. (Underwriting is the process that determines whether someone is eligible for a loan and under what terms.) The government-supported enterprises (GSEs) also offer a manual underwriting process for more complex cases.

Credit scores will still matter for both forms of underwriting, but abandoning a hard minimum means that someone with a credit score just below the prior minimum will now be able to get a mortgage so long as they are reducing credit risk in other ways, such as by offering a large down payment. Some borrowers with credit scores below 620 may in fact be good risks, at least at the rate offered by the lender.

The GSEs have an immense amount of data at their disposal to develop models to predict the risk that any particular borrower will default. If they are doing good actuarial work to predict those risks and price mortgage loans appropriately, there is no need for them to maintain an arbitrary minimum credit score.

I’ve been critical of counterproductive proposals to try to make housing more affordable and available by subsidizing demand. The 50-year mortgage proposal floated by Bill Pulte, the Federal Housing Finance Agency director, deservedly faced a lot of questions and now appears dead. (His new proposal to allow “portable” mortgages in which homebuyers can keep the terms, especially the interest rates, of mortgages on the houses they are leaving could be a better idea, depending on implementation. It could reduce mortgage lock-in and free up new homes for sale.)

But the new Fannie Mae rule seems to be a technical adjustment rather than a result of political pressure to make more loans. Private mortgage lenders will still be able to apply their own credit score minimums, and credit scores will still play a big role in the mortgage guarantees that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offer. The social media outrage cycle seems to have jumped the gun on this one.

It is with great sadness that we mark the recent passing of former AIER Chairman of the Board of Trustees and longstanding Voting Member, Gregory (Gregg) M. van Kipnis on the evening of Saturday, November 8, 2025, in New York.

A student of the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises at New York University where he obtained his MBA in economics and finance, Gregg had a long and distinguished career in finance, business, and banking. Among many other positions, he served as President and CEO of Invictus Partners; Executive Vice President at Jefferies & Co.; Managing Director of NatWest Financial Products in London; and a Principal at Morgan Stanley. In his early career, Gregg was an economist and research director at Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, as well as the IBM Corporation. Most recently, Gregg was a General Partner and then consultant to the Tiedemann Investment Group. He was also a member of the boards of directors of several financial firms.

Throughout his life, and as a sign of his commitment to a society of free and responsible people, Gregg was involved in several philanthropic activities and professional associations. Additionally, Gregg taught courses in topics ranging from capital markets, microeconomics, and corporate finance at Spring Hill College, the University of South Alabama, and American University. Gregg also served as a captain in the United States Air Force from 1968-1971, which included time at the Pentagon.

A longtime supporter of AIER and its mission, Gregg became Chairman of the Board of Trustees in 2016 and remained in that position through 2024. He was also Chairman of the Board of Directors of American Investment Services (AIS), an SEC Registered Investment Adviser founded in 1978 and wholly owned by AIER.

In all these governance capacities, Gregg made substantial and lasting contributions to AIER’s growth and vitality, for which he sought no acknowledgment, and which played an indispensable role in establishing AIER as one of America’s leading classical liberal and free market institutions. For all these things as well as his counsel and guidance, the Board of Trustees and staff of AIER and AIS are deeply grateful.

In forthcoming weeks, there will be remembrances of Gregory M. van Kipnis by people who knew him well. But on behalf of AIER, we extend our deepest condolences to his beloved wife, Theresa (Terry), his daughters, and his extended family.

Terry W. Anker, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, AIER

Samuel Gregg, President (Interim), AIER