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In recent decades, and especially since the release of OpenAI’s large language model ChatGPT in 2022, artificial intelligence use has rapidly spread into almost every industry. And as AI proliferates, so do fears that a wave of mass unemployment will follow. Concerns are widespread that AI will be deployed to accomplish an ever-greater share of the labor needed throughout the economy, leaving fewer and fewer jobs available for human workers.

This fear led Dario Amodei, one of the world’s leading AI technologists, to sound the alarm earlier this year about an impending “white-collar bloodbath.” The Anthropic CEO told Axios that one very possible scenario within the next one to five years is that, “Cancer is cured, the economy grows at 10 percent a year, the budget is balanced — and 20 percent of people don’t have jobs.”

This was predictably latched onto by economic interventionists, such as US Senator Bernie Sanders. “We must demand that increased worker productivity from AI benefits working people, not just wealthy stockholders on Wall St,” Sanders posted on X in response to Amodei’s statement. Sanders later posted that, “With the explosion of AI, new technology and increased worker productivity, we should demand a shorter work week, increased life expectancy and a decent standard of living for all.” Other politicians have gone even further since then. US Senator Josh Hawley, like Tucker Carlson started advocating years ago, supports banning self-driving cars to protect the jobs of car and truck drivers.

Indeed, AI has already created countless efficiencies and new capabilities throughout the economy that have made specific jobs redundant. Consider the global herbicide industry. A Bloomberg article titled “AI-Powered Weed-Killing Robots Threaten a $37 Billion Market” explains:

After almost a century of deploying a more-is-more approach to chemical herbicides, the global agricultural sector is rapidly rolling out advancements that promise to curb the use of weed-control sprays by as much as 90 percent. Using artificial-intelligence powered cameras, the new sprayers can identify and target invasive plants while avoiding the cash crops. If even a fraction of growers adopt the new tools, it could mean a big shift for crop-chemical majors like Bayer AG and BASF SE.

This potential tenfold improvement in herbicide use efficiency may significantly reduce the agricultural demand for herbicide production, and thus put many people out of their jobs in that industry. And this is just one example. From facilitating new scientific research methods, to transforming solar cell production, to improving healthcare safety, to proliferating self-driving car use, AI offers new ways of doing things throughout every industry, which devalues some skillsets in the job market and rewards others.

However, there is an opposite fear as well. Last month, during a press conference the day he won the 2025 Nobel Prize in economics, Joel Mokyr gave a speech about the grand sweep of economic history. Toward the end of his lecture he weighed in on the AI job loss debate: “As I see it, the main concern about the labor market is not technological unemployment. It’s labor scarcity.”

Mokyr is an economic historian who is renowned for looking at the big picture. And when you do that, it is clear that technological unemployment is nowhere near as big a concern as the set of problems that AI will help solve if politicians like Bernie Sanders and Josh Hawley don’t succeed in debilitating it.

Specific jobs becoming obsolete is only one side of the coin of technology’s effect on employment. The other side of the coin reveals why artificial intelligence will lead to no overall reduction in employment opportunities. Like all prior technological revolutions, AI will create at least as many jobs as it eliminates, and most importantly, the new jobs will tend to be preferable to and easier to find than the old jobs.

Unemployment rates have remained relatively constant and quite low in recent decades, currently standing at about 4.3 percent in the US and 4.9 percent across the globe, according to recent estimates. This is approximately as low as they have ever been.

Meanwhile, ever since the industrial revolution, there has been an explosion of technological advancement and proliferation that has almost completely transformed all economic industries and everyday life across the globe.

Virtually every instance of technological progress reduces the need to employ some specific form of labor. Dish washing machines have meant that homes and restaurants need only employ a small fraction of the cleaning staff that was once required per meal served. Refrigeration has conserved countless labor hours preserving foods. Electric power has exponentiated the manufacturing capability of each factory worker by enabling a new class of machinery. And the list goes on and on.

The constantly low unemployment rate, in light of recent history’s technological progress, would amaze the Industrial-Revolution-era activist group known as the Luddites, a radical labor movement of anti-technologists who rioted and destroyed factory machinery to protect their jobs from automation in the early 19th-century. Their initial concern was for the jobs of craftsmen competing with mechanized looms and knitting equipment that allowed a single worker to produce the output of a hundred craftsmen. But the scope of Luddite animosity quickly widened to oppose industrialization generally.

The nineteenth-century Luddites made the same mistake, known to economists as the “lump of labor fallacy,” that antagonists of AI are making today. In a New York Times article titled “Trump, Immigration and the Lump of Labor Fallacy,” Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman explains the fallacy: “This is the view that there is a fixed amount of work to be done and that if someone or something — some group of workers or some kind of machine — is doing some of that work, that means fewer jobs for everyone else.”

Krugman also explains why this “lump of labor” view is false:

When incomes rise, people will find something to spend their money on, creating jobs for workers displaced by technology or newcomers to the work force. Machines do, in fact, perform many tasks that used to require people; output per worker is more than four times what it was [in 1952], so we could produce 1952’s level of output with only a quarter as many workers. In fact, however, employment has tripled. … No, AI and automation, for all the changes they may bring, won’t ultimately take away jobs, and neither will immigrants.

The point about “incomes rising” is key, because it is a predictable consequence of technological automation and it is also the reason, along with new forms of work created by new technologies, why the newly created jobs will tend to be preferable to the old jobs.

Workers will only be displaced by technology if the technology is capable of producing more valuable output, meaning some net-positive combination of cheaper and higher quality, than human labor. Otherwise, mechanization won’t be profitable and employers will stick to employing humans. Therefore, we can safely bet that wherever AI is displacing human workers, consumers are benefitting from some net-positive combination of falling prices and rising quality. This means that consumers will have more income left to spend, and will therefore consume an ever-wider range of goods and services, thus funding more and more niche forms of employment that replace the jobs lost to technological improvements in the production process.

This is crystal clear if you look at the history of labor specialization. Since the mid 19th century, agriculture has gone from employing about 70 percent of US workers to employing only 2 percent. Meanwhile, the productivity of US agriculture has massively increased due to improved farming technology and food has become about 10 times more affordable for blue-collar workers in the last century.



If no new jobs had been created in America since 1840, this process would have left 68 percent of the population permanently out of work. But to the contrary, the modern economy is composed largely of jobs that people in any prior century probably never even imagined. Web designers, pet therapists, dietitians, travel agents, nail technicians, cosmetic surgeons, neuroscientists, and countless others are employed in now-common forms of labor that would have seemed either laughably frivolous or entirely unimaginable just a century ago. “Really, therapy for my dog while my children are starving?”

For a detailed description of one of the most recent and frivolous new industries imaginable, read the article titled “Does Your Plant Need a Nanny? A new crop of caretakers will spritz, polish and prune your houseplants — and even send photos while you’re away.” published by the New York Times in April. These new “plant nannies” offer virtual plant visits, and services such as speaking to, lighting, and photographing plants while their owners are away, in addition to traditional plant maintenance practices.

New and ever-more-niche and personalized forms of work are constantly made possible by the vast abundance of labor and consumption freed up by labor-saving technology. Monotonous or backbreaking tasks are left to machines while humans are freed to invent new tasks to pay each other for with all the wealth that technological efficiencies have saved or created for them.

As amazing as the present is compared to the past, the future can be an even more extreme improvement. If AI proves powerful enough to continuously transform the macroeconomy as the fearmongers predict, and so do I, this will mean such massive productivity gains that machines will eventually be running the farms and factories at almost no cost. This will render necessities more and more affordable until almost every worker can engage in more niche artforms, services, and research areas than employ almost anyone full-time in today’s economy. In addition, whole new realms of technological possibility can be unlocked, in outer space, the Metaverse, and elsewhere.

It is hard to imagine ever reaching a logical conclusion of this process, at which artificial intelligence is better than human labor for literally every purpose. That would even involve convincing those who prefer some services to have a “human touch” for sentimental, aesthetic, philosophical, or spiritual reasons that human labor is unhelpful even to them. If AI does get that powerful, that will be an end of material scarcity in which everything is free and worrying about “unemployment” will make no sense at all.

Instead of worrying about that hypothetical utopia of widespread godlike agency and infinite abundance, let’s focus on reducing human drudgery and increasing material wealth by proliferating artificial intelligence and other technological progress in the here and now.

Democratic Socialism, at least recently, is a growth brand. According to The Nation, between 2016 and 2020 membership in the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) grew from 6,000 to over 90,000. And an article at reformandrevolution.org — the website of a “revolutionary Marxist caucus” of the DSA — claimed that after the 2024 presidential election the DSA experienced “a 5-6 times increase in new recruits.” 

The group’s political success also impresses. Nationally prominent politicians such as Rashida Tlaib and Zohran Mamdani are formal members. Others, such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie Sanders, self-identify as democratic socialists. 

Hoping to understand the brand’s cachet, and how long its growth may last, one night I dropped down the DSA rabbit hole to experience it for myself. Several videos from the 2025 national convention, which took place in Chicago in early August, are available on YouTube. 

A roundtable discussion titled “The Left and The Family” first caught my eye. Onstage, four women wearing facemasks led the discussion. They seemed despondent at the state of the US under Trump. 

“We are in an extremely reactionary moment. We are in a fascist moment,” one said, before introducing the idea of “family abolition.” There followed some soul-searching about what this term means. The panelists were not against familial relationships per se, but rather against the “white patriarchal” nuclear family as a foundation of society. 

The conversation wound between ideas both defensible (“it’s a myth that there is one mother to any of us,”) and absurd (child protective services exist to channel children into prison so they can serve as cheap labor for capitalists). Overall, sentiment favored a future in which interpersonal life will have less to do with family and more to do with the collective.  

To me, it didn’t sound like a future to relish. And given the DSA’s meteoric rise to relevance, the room overall seemed to be light on joie de vivre. Had newly elected New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani been present, his persistently earnest smile might have leavened the vibe a bit. 

Or maybe I just needed something more remedial to help get my head around the DSA mindset. An older video offered a slideshow on basic socialism narrated by the DSA’s national co-chair, Megan Romer. It was candid, enlightening, and reasonably upbeat. My first light-bulb moment came when Romer explained how becoming a socialist is not typically an involved intellectual process. 

“Most people become socialist because of one issue,” Romer said. “They usually become socialists because of something they specifically got mad about in the news. That is the primary thing that makes people become a socialist.” 

It struck me as odd. I don’t recall anger playing a big role in my support for capitalism, other than maybe learning the plight of independent thinkers in places like the Soviet Union or Maoist China. 

Being an economics major in college, there was also an intellectual aspect to my worldview. It formed slowly as I gained insight into the beneficial organizing power of free markets. Capitalism may not create social utopias, but at least it generates the greatest level of economic wealth in human history. 

The slideshow continued with an explanation of Marxism. The highlight was a slide with a laid-back-looking Karl Marx in a convertible (something capitalist economies have likely produced far better than communist). “Get in loser,” the caption read; “We’re seizing the means of production.” 

From there, the presentation bogged down in industrial-age tropes of leisurely, cigar-chomping capitalists, whom Romer termed “bosses,” and their exploited proletariat workforce. Two centuries after Marx, socialism has trouble reckoning with capitalism’s social mobility and its expansion and empowerment of the middle class.  

Though I don’t consider myself a proletarian, I’ve had many bosses in my career, some better than others. But the truth is that most worked longer hours than I did. And almost all had more experience than me. This probably explains why their paychecks were bigger than mine. Socialism, however, is a narrative that needs a cartoonish villain, and the capitalist overlord oppressing underlings provides it.  

In the end, I came out of the DSA rabbit hole unswayed to socialism. But maybe winning arguments isn’t the group’s main goal. My second lightbulb moment had come when Romer informed the audience that they should not expect socialism to gain power through a contest of ideas. 

“Power only cedes itself to a greater degree of power,” she said. “We win by making conditions so intolerable for the ruling class that they would rather give in to our demands than continue to live with the disturbance we cause, until we are able to fully seize power ourselves.” 

There is an old saying that those who are not communist before age 30 have no heart, and those who are still communist after age 30 have no brain. The heart is not only the seat of affection but of anger, something few people had more of than Karl Marx. From what I saw, modern democratic socialists are carrying his legacy forward with hearts that have moved from anger to a desire for control. In the end, seizing the means of production requires control of not only private businesses, natural resources, and factories, but human bodies and minds. It’s a road many nations have gone down with tragic results. Let’s hope the US isn’t next. 

About a year ago, I was in a room full of financial professionals explaining how the corporate engagement firm I work for, Bowyer Research, is dialoguing with Apple on the issue of child safety. Discussing the best ways to combat online child sex abuse material (CSAM) is not a fun story. As I explained the reality of Apple’s CSAM problem, in a room largely made up of Apple users, I saw a lot of concerned expressions and awkward glances at iPhones on conference tables. It’s an understandable reaction. But it drives home the point that those of us in this industry wake up every day trying to make— and I said as much.

Child exploitation is what predators do with their iPhones. Stopping child exploitation is what we’re doing with *our* iPhones.

Let me back up. My day job, corporate engagement, involves helping shareholders of companies like Apple use their financial influence to have conversations about issues at the world’s biggest brands. Oftentimes, these conversations surround corporate politicization, ESG, DEI, and the like. But, during the past two years, we’ve been having conversations at Apple about something more bipartisan: stopping the distribution of child sex abuse material.

It’s a conversation that needs to happen. The company that gave us the iPhone has driven some of the most successful and recognizable innovations in the modern world. But Apple has also staked out a definite position in the privacy-versus-oversight debate. Those incredibly high-profile privacy commitments are ingrained into the company’s ethos, and it’s for that reason that engaging them on the issue of online child safety has been such a complicated endeavor. Despite Apple’s commitments to human rights and its stated belief that “business can and should be a force for good,” the company’s been facing down a massive CSAM distribution issue. Apple recently was the subject of a $1.2 billion class action lawsuit, with victims of child sex abuse alleging that the company didn’t appropriately address videos of their abuse being distributed on platforms such as iMessage. Apple notably rolled back a planned anti-CSAM technology called NeuralHash in 2022 over privacy concerns, sparking criticism from child safety organizations.

It’s not that the technology didn’t exist, but that Apple decided the cost-benefit analysis wasn’t in its favor. That decision, right or wrong, has had real-world consequences, including significant legal liability for Apple. Investors are therefore right to ask how the company arrived at the decision to roll back the software.

This isn’t merely a moral point but an economic one (and in an aspirationally free and virtuous society, those two are connected). It was time for shareholders to get involved. Last year, Bowyer Research filed a shareholder proposal at Apple on behalf of American Family Association, an Apple investor, asking the company to publicly report the costs and benefits of not deploying anti-CSAM software. The proposal received enough shareholder support for us to bring it back this year. More importantly, it gained us several productive discussions with the company to discuss child safety.

We’d all do well to remember that the issues and decisions facing America’s biggest companies are not merely issues to be opined about by external nonprofits, NGOs, and pundits (although countless admirable, constructive examples of such entities exist). They were investor-to-company discussions. 

Shareholders, the individuals and institutions who own Apple and are literally bought into its business model and responsibility for continued success, deserve a larger and more serious role in that discussion. In a properly functioning company with a fiduciary duty to its investors, CEOs work for boards, and boards for shareholders. Investors, whose continued returns depend on companies making the right decisions, absolutely have something to say about controversial issues that those companies must navigate. Apple’s choices on combating online child abuse are no different.

And those discussions yielded results. After two years of constructive engagement from the American Family Association, along with increased legislative scrutiny regarding age protections from red states like Utah and Texas, Apple adopted changes to its child safety protocols: restrictions on underage users viewing adult-rated apps in its App Store and stringent explicit content filtering for underage users on iMessage.

This is a major win. Not just for investors, but for the almost 90 percent of teens who reportedly own iPhones. It’s a big step in the right direction to make sure that online predators have fewer tools to abuse children online. And it’s an indicator of yet another point that those of us in the corporate engagement world wake up every day to defend: genuine shareholder advocacy creates real impact.

For a long time, people have defended the idea that the best approach to values-based investing is screening out any problematic stocks from a portfolio (common categories are defense stocks, energy companies that prioritize fossil fuels, and the like). But right now, results we’re seeing at the world’s most valuable brand indicate there’s a more impactful approach than screening.

When you screen a company out of your portfolio, you give up your leverage with that company, bringing your investor influence to zero. But when you use your investor influence to dialogue about the issues that impact the companies you own (and therefore, impact your future), you are maximizing your investor influence. It’s not just Apple — we’re seeing results at companies across sectors, from viewpoint protections at JPMorgan Chase to depoliticized corporate policies at tech giants like IBM. Shareholder advocacy like the American Family Association’s gets discussions, builds relationships, and creates genuine change.

Too often, we talk about fixing businesses as if companies can only ever choose between doing the morally correct thing or making money. This is false framing. When it comes to child safety, Apple is making the right move not only for its youngest and most vulnerable users but for the investors who depend on its continued success for their financial future. And we’re right to celebrate that as a win for the shareholder advocacy model. This isn’t a moment to lean out and divest.

Social media has been discussing Fannie Mae’s announcement that the organization will no longer require a minimum credit score of 620 for mortgages. Is this a big deal?

Likely not. Freddie Mac has already dropped its minimum credit score requirement. These requirements applied to the automated underwriting process for mortgages. (Underwriting is the process that determines whether someone is eligible for a loan and under what terms.) The government-supported enterprises (GSEs) also offer a manual underwriting process for more complex cases.

Credit scores will still matter for both forms of underwriting, but abandoning a hard minimum means that someone with a credit score just below the prior minimum will now be able to get a mortgage so long as they are reducing credit risk in other ways, such as by offering a large down payment. Some borrowers with credit scores below 620 may in fact be good risks, at least at the rate offered by the lender.

The GSEs have an immense amount of data at their disposal to develop models to predict the risk that any particular borrower will default. If they are doing good actuarial work to predict those risks and price mortgage loans appropriately, there is no need for them to maintain an arbitrary minimum credit score.

I’ve been critical of counterproductive proposals to try to make housing more affordable and available by subsidizing demand. The 50-year mortgage proposal floated by Bill Pulte, the Federal Housing Finance Agency director, deservedly faced a lot of questions and now appears dead. (His new proposal to allow “portable” mortgages in which homebuyers can keep the terms, especially the interest rates, of mortgages on the houses they are leaving could be a better idea, depending on implementation. It could reduce mortgage lock-in and free up new homes for sale.)

But the new Fannie Mae rule seems to be a technical adjustment rather than a result of political pressure to make more loans. Private mortgage lenders will still be able to apply their own credit score minimums, and credit scores will still play a big role in the mortgage guarantees that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offer. The social media outrage cycle seems to have jumped the gun on this one.

It is with great sadness that we mark the recent passing of former AIER Chairman of the Board of Trustees and longstanding Voting Member, Gregory (Gregg) M. van Kipnis on the evening of Saturday, November 8, 2025, in New York.

A student of the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises at New York University where he obtained his MBA in economics and finance, Gregg had a long and distinguished career in finance, business, and banking. Among many other positions, he served as President and CEO of Invictus Partners; Executive Vice President at Jefferies & Co.; Managing Director of NatWest Financial Products in London; and a Principal at Morgan Stanley. In his early career, Gregg was an economist and research director at Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, as well as the IBM Corporation. Most recently, Gregg was a General Partner and then consultant to the Tiedemann Investment Group. He was also a member of the boards of directors of several financial firms.

Throughout his life, and as a sign of his commitment to a society of free and responsible people, Gregg was involved in several philanthropic activities and professional associations. Additionally, Gregg taught courses in topics ranging from capital markets, microeconomics, and corporate finance at Spring Hill College, the University of South Alabama, and American University. Gregg also served as a captain in the United States Air Force from 1968-1971, which included time at the Pentagon.

A longtime supporter of AIER and its mission, Gregg became Chairman of the Board of Trustees in 2016 and remained in that position through 2024. He was also Chairman of the Board of Directors of American Investment Services (AIS), an SEC Registered Investment Adviser founded in 1978 and wholly owned by AIER.

In all these governance capacities, Gregg made substantial and lasting contributions to AIER’s growth and vitality, for which he sought no acknowledgment, and which played an indispensable role in establishing AIER as one of America’s leading classical liberal and free market institutions. For all these things as well as his counsel and guidance, the Board of Trustees and staff of AIER and AIS are deeply grateful.

In forthcoming weeks, there will be remembrances of Gregory M. van Kipnis by people who knew him well. But on behalf of AIER, we extend our deepest condolences to his beloved wife, Theresa (Terry), his daughters, and his extended family.

Terry W. Anker, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, AIER

Samuel Gregg, President (Interim), AIER

In recent weeks, the debate over Venezuela has intensified, largely due to the military pressure that the Trump Administration has placed on Maduro’s regime. This has led various political figures, journalists, and analysts to revisit Venezuela’s recent history and the causes that drove the Maduro regime to provoke the worst economic collapse ever recorded in the Western world — an 80 percent GDP contraction in less than a decade. The crisis becomes even more shocking when considering that Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves. 

As with Cuba, defenders of the Venezuelan regime have attributed the country’s economic collapse to US sanctions — which they incorrectly call a “blockade” — rather than to the political, economic, and social model imposed by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. That model brought massive state controls, expropriations, corruption, persecution of the opposition and the press, the destruction of the rule of law, and the elimination of judicial guarantees for investment. 

Recently, Dr. Steve Hall, a professor at Teesside University in England, argued on X that US sanctions were responsible for Venezuela’s economic deterioration. After facing widespread criticism, he made his account private — but this was the chart he shared: 

The graph shows that starting in the year 2000, Venezuela’s economy began to surge, driven by a sharp increase in oil prices. When Hugo Chávez and his socialist movement came to power, oil traded at around $18 per barrel, due largely to the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s. However, in 2003, following the US invasion of Iraq, OPEC cut production, and several global catalysts pushed prices above $100 per barrel — granting the Venezuelan regime unprecedented wealth, which it used to consolidate power at home and finance the “expansion of the revolution” across Latin America. 

The Five Phases of Socialism 

For years, I’ve explained the five stages socialist economies go through once they take power: 

  1. Euphoria 
  2. Peak Prosperity 
  3. Reality Shock 
  4. Collapse into Misery 
  5. Stabilization of Poverty and Totalitarianism 

In Venezuela’s GDP chart, we can see each phase unfold clearly. 

When Chávez came to power, the regime “redistributed” part of the oil windfall through populist missions that temporarily reduced poverty. But soon came the heavy economic regulations, price controls, expropriations, rampant corruption, redistribution without investment, and uncontrolled money printing. Over time, the country entered phase three — the “reality shock” — when the regime’s repressive nature became evident, poverty deepened, and the process of stabilizing misery and consolidating totalitarianism began. 

In Venezuela’s case, phase three began around 2011, phase four around 2013, and phase five — the totalitarian stage — emerged in 2014. That same year, Venezuela’s mass migration crisis exploded, driven by poverty and political repression. 

In 2014, not a single sanction had yet been imposed on the Chávez regime. Still, Venezuela recorded a 4.8 percent GDP contraction and 68.5 percent inflation. In 2015, President Barack Obama imposed the first individual sanctions against regime officials — freezing assets and revoking visas — but the US continued to buy Venezuelan oil, and the country still traded freely with the world. This remained the case until 2019, when President Donald Trump finally sanctioned the state oil company PDVSA, freezing its US assets and banning transactions with American entities. 

However, even before that, in 2018 — when there were still no oil sanctions — Venezuela suffered hyperinflation exceeding 130,000 percent and a GDP drop of 19.6 percent. By then, millions of Venezuelans had fled, fuel lines stretched up to 48 hours, blackouts occurred daily, and shortages of basic goods spawned a black market for deodorant, toilet paper, milk, and meat. 

The Counterintuitive Effect of Sanctions 

Economic sanctions are used by Washington as a coercive tool to punish anti-democratic regimes and US adversaries by cutting off their financial lifelines to weaken or destabilize them. However, in Venezuela’s case, sanctions had a paradoxical effect — they triggered a brief economic rebound. 

Let me explain briefly. 

Venezuela is officially a narco-state led by Nicolás Maduro. Conservative estimates suggest that corruption by regime officials has siphoned off more than $500 billion — money that for years was diverted or invested in Europe and the United States. 

When broader economic sanctions were finally applied, the regime was forced to lift many of its rigid economic controls in order to survive. For several years, a de facto “anarchic market” emerged in Venezuela — to the point that outlets like The New York Times and Bloomberg mistakenly claimed that Maduro was “turning toward capitalism.” 

In reality, Chávista elites, pressured by sanctions, had to withdraw their fortunes from the US and Europe and reinvest them inside Venezuela. They needed to repatriate capital, launder money, and at the same time ease the severe shortages afflicting the country. 

Although it was technically “illegal” to trade in US dollars or any currency other than the bolívar, these restrictions were effectively abolished, along with import and export controls. Markets quickly filled with imported goods, private-sector wages rose, local production slightly recovered, and after an 80 percent GDP plunge over a decade, Venezuela saw small signs of economic life. 

In their struggle for survival, and spurred by sanctions, Maduro’s regime dismantled much of the socialist economic control apparatus — unintentionally allowing market forces to partially heal the damage caused by decades of socialist mismanagement. 

Thus, while one can debate whether sanctions have been effective in weakening an anti-democratic, criminal regime, what cannot be argued is that sanctions caused the worst economic collapse ever recorded in the Americas. The full responsibility lies with socialism itself. 

When it comes to economic policy, Donald Trump is a statist menace. Full stop.

His obsession with tariffs isn’t grounded in just classic protectionist aid to domestic industries, but actually embodies a much grander and more dangerous Caesarian notion: Namely, that America is a giant corporation and Trump its all-powerful CEO, empowered to gallop around the globe cutting great big beautiful deals to bring investment, jobs, production, societal uplift and foreign policy victories, too, pouring into America’s hinterlands.

In that context, the Donald has tortured the nation’s poorly drafted trade statutes into economic battering rams, thereby enabling him to deploy tariffs for any purpose that suits his momentary fancy. Thus, his initial 25 percent “reciprocal” tariff on Japan was reduced to 15 percent in trade for $550 billion of ill-defined Japanese investments in the US. Likewise, the BRICS were threatened with a 100 percent tariff if they didn’t use the dollar to conduct trade with each other, and India got clobbered with an additional 25 percent tariff because its refineries found it economically expedient to buy the cheapest crude on the market — Russian Urals — in defiance of Washington’s nix on the latter.

In a similar manner, consumers of Chinese imports such as toys and kitchen cabinets got nailed with a 20 percent “fentanyl tariff,” a tax on American buyers, but allegedly to punish Beijing for not stopping the export of the drug’s chemical precursors. Of course, the next one-step-removed intermediates for making precursors like NPP and ANPP can be sourced from almost any chemical industry on the planet, while the only reason there is a US market for synthesized fentanyl in the first place is that Washington’s war on drugs has driven prices of other illicit drugs sky high.

Still, Trump is now crowing that he eased his spanking of Chairman Xi to just 10 percent because at their recent summit, the latter apparently pinky swore that he’d do better limiting precursor exports in the future.

Moreover, the president’s tariff mayhem has little if anything to do with historic tit-for-tat import duties because there flat-out isn’t an unfair tariff problem in today’s world. The weighted average tariff on goods traded internationally has dropped from nearly 10 percent in the early 1990s to barely 2 percent at present.

But the smoking gun lies in America’s own trade statistics, which the president obviously ignores. To wit, in 2024, the US had a massive trade deficit in goods, with exports of $2.06 trillion being dwarfed by imports of $3.27 trillion. But that imbalance had nothing whatsoever to do with tariffs. According to Elon Musk’s Grok 4, the US tariffed these imports at 2.2 percent in 2024, or slightly higher than the average 1.6 percent tariff levied by trading partners on our exports. And it wasn’t non-tariff barriers either: America’s NTBs are among the worst in the world.

No, the problem isn’t bad trade deals and foreign cheats; it’s the fact that the Fed has inflated the bejesus out of domestic prices, wages, and costs for decades. The CPI is up by 700 percent since Nixon severed the dollar’s anchor to gold in 1971, and that has pulled production and wage costs in the US relentlessly higher. It is no wonder, therefore, that thanks to the Fed’s pro-inflation policies, fully loaded manufacturing wage rates at $44.25 per hour in the US tower over those of our competitors, including Japan and the EU. So if you want to find the culprit look no further than the figures below.

Average Fully Loaded Manufacturing Wages Per Hour in 2024

  • Vietnam: $3.50.
  • India: $4.50.
  • Mexico: $5.00.
  • China: $6.00.
  • South Korea: $20.50.
  • Canada: $22.00.
  • Japan: $28.00.
  • UK: $30.00.
  • EU-27: $32.50.
  • USA: $44.25

But if there is no valid predicate for Trump’s unhinged tariffing, his recent slapping of an extra 10 percent tariff on Canada reminds us that Trump’s rendition of Caesarian statism is an exceedingly dangerous thing: Ottawa’s offense was that one of its provinces dared to run a video clip from a full-throated pro-free trade radio address by President Reagan in 1987.

Yes, US imports of $412 billion from Canada in 2024 vastly exceeded exports to Canada of $350 billion, but tariffs had nothing to do with it: The tariff rates were essentially 0.0 percent on both sides thanks to President Trump’s own ballyhooed USMCA free trade agreement.

The latest 10 percent levy on American consumers of Canadian goods, therefore, represents the pure pique of an unhinged wannabe global wheeler and dealer who thinks he’s still playing hardball with plumbing subcontractors in Queens. The fact is, Trump can’t huff and puff his tariffs high enough to eliminate the huge trade deficit with our neighbor to the north because the real problem lies in the Eccles Building.

Meanwhile, Trump’s claim that Ontario’s ad was a fraud because Ronald Reagan loved tariffs, too, is truly preposterous. The Gipper, for whom I worked as Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 1981–1985, was a true-blue believer in free markets and would have never dreamed of storming around the globe making ad hoc economic deals while sliding by the seat of his pants. President Reagan believed that government was the problem, not the solution, and that its main job was to get out of the way to the maximum extent possible so that businesses and entrepreneurs operating on the free market could take care of investment, job creation, and the resulting rise in societal wealth.

Yes, he deviated from strict free trade a few times, but I know from personal experience that it wasn’t because he thought tariffs, quotas, or other protectionist measures would help. In the case of the largest deviation from free trade — the 1.68 million cap on Japanese auto imports —   President Reagan got flat-out tricked. 

The protectionists in the Administration led by DOT Secretary Drew Lewis of Pennsylvania and Commerce Secretary Mac Baldrige, a New England manufacturer, fostered a legislated auto quota bill on Capitol Hill and then secretly urged the Japanese to offer a “voluntary” export limit to thwart it. President Reagan was very busy with other things in the spring of 1981, including getting shot, and never did realize there was nothing much “voluntary” about it.

In the case of the semiconductor tariff, it was a case of national security hawks and neocons painting the usual false story that it was too dangerous to rely on semiconductors from Japan. Then again, America had an army of 50,000 troops in Japan, and the island was surrounded by the US Seventh Fleet, while Japan was still essentially disarmed. In this case, Reagan had an unfortunate weak spot for national security canards, not a Trumpian lust for trade restrictions.

The most telling case, however, was when the drumbeat for steel quotas reached a fever pitch. But in this case, the Gipper authorized me to negotiate a deal with the steel industry when Mac Balridge was out of town. I worked hurriedly and cemented a quota deal with the industry that had more loopholes than a block of Swiss cheese, thereby putting Baldrige and the steel protectionists out of business without too much damage done.

At the end of the day, Ronald Reagan would have abhorred the entire Trumpian TariffPalooza. That’s because he knew that in a free economy, the job of the President is to keep the Leviathan on the Potomac at bay, not usurp the jobs, income, and wealth-creating function of free men on free markets.

Authors rarely get it right the first time. For three decades, Swedish historian and liberal debater Johan Norberg has made the case for liberty and free markets. Internationally, he first made a name for himself in 2001 with In Defense of Global Capitalism, arguing against anti-capitalist, left-wing movements, following the WTO summit in Seattle in 1999.

I first learned to appreciate Norberg’s flowing and impassioned style in a book about liberalism’s history in Sweden, and his early, economic history-focused — and Joel Mokyr-influenced — Swedish-only book När Människan Skapade Världen. When Mokyr won the Nobel this year, Norberg remarked that his secret sauce has unfortunately been revealed to the world: “The only problem with Joel Mokyr winning the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences is that people will realize where I get all my ideas from.”

The final nail in the coffin that was my youthful socialism was Norberg’s short, obscure, and untranslated book on migration from 2012. In the spirit of a typical open-borders libertarianism, he and his co-author marshaled arguments for why free trade and free association among all the world’s peoples make us better off. That appealed to me strongly and was exactly the intellectual bridge I needed to cross over from the dark red side.

His recent creations have been less inspiring (which I’ve mostly chalked up to the fact that I’m no longer his target audience). His passionate The Capitalist Manifesto from a few years ago was rather dull and same-old, same-old… but presumably there are more people like me in desperate need of hearing the best case for freedom and markets by as astute a writer as Norberg. The most refreshing part of that book was Norberg’s own reflection on how the intellectual landscape has shifted: He used to debate people from the left, whereas now the enemies of globalization and free trade come mostly from the right — and nobody learned the lesson of trade as mutually beneficial. 

Open: The Story of Human Progress, released in 2020, was completely swamped by the fervor of that year’s desire to close societies — whether due to fear of diseases, market activities, or dreams of megalomaniac control. 

How Civilizations Rise and Fall

With this year’s Peak Human, Norberg got another shot at the story in Open. And he nailed it: This is the book that the COVID-drenched one should have been. His almost metaphysical perspective on societies growing and changing shines through; his painstaking collection of catchy quotes and observations by contemporary voices and historians is golden. Walking us through the rise and fall of seven famous empires — from Athens and Rome to Baghdad and Renaissance Italy and, of course, the Anglosphere takeover from around 1600 — we’re treated to some recurring patterns. Civilizations grow rich from their openness, creativity, and relatively free markets; they consequently fall apart when rulers squeeze too hard, overreach in their military adventures, and abandon the ideals and market liberty that once made them rich. 

This is the story of human civilization, seen not over election cycles or decades but generations and centuries. His great strength as an author and intellectual was always weaving together an inspiring, relevant story from a mismash of confusing scholarly records. His great value add isn’t original research (it’s all secondary sources), and instead he pulls together an impressive array of material across history and literature, economics and politics. 

Speaking both to a historical audience interested in the fall of civilizations past (thinking about Rome) and the chattering classes of a certain dominant hegemon currently dead-set on tearing itself apart, Norberg points out that outsiders “can’t kill curiosity or creativity. Only we can do that to ourselves.”

America’s history is deeply intertwined with the European civilization whence it came. The European civilizations of Renaissance Italy and the magnificent Dutch first jumped the English Channel and then the Atlantic. They had a curious tendency to project their ideas onto the next one: “Just as Great Britain was the proudest achievement of the Dutch, the United States was the greatest achievement of the British.” Long live the real King?

Perhaps you’ve heard that the dominance of the English-speaking peoples was built on the backs of slaves. While somewhat true, it’s far from the full story or even the most interesting one; compared to every other empire in human history, it’s even trivial. What’s so remarkable about the British empire, and the American one following in its scraps, wasn’t that it had slaves or dealt in the slave trade, but, remarks Norberg, that it stopped — and then used its technologically dominant navy to hunt down others who continued. 

Slaves arriving in America in 1619 were par for the course in world history: “It was just one in an until-then seemingly inevitable, endless series of crimes against the inalienable right to self-ownership.” What made the Anglosphere special was Britain’s intellectual and financial innovations and America’s permissionless experimentation. America became more European than the OG Europeans themselves, right down to the political philosophy forever enshrined in the Constitution. 

Who Will Build the Roads, Engels?

If you thought this was yet another anti-left tirade by a free marketeer, think again: Both the national right and the woke left, argues Norberg, are “hopelessly unhistorical in their crusades against cultural hotchpotch.” Civilizations, present and past, aren’t “monoliths with inherent traits, but complex, growing things defined by how they engage with, adopt and adapt […] what they find elsewhere.” It’s the connections between humans that make up the civilizations on which they rest. It’s the open-mindedness of embracing another culture’s better knowledge or practices that matters. 

One memorable observation in Norberg’s deep dive down the rabbit hole of intellectual history is found in Friedrich Engels, from The Condition of the Working Class in England, no less, where Engels remarked with wonder about the “network of the finest roadways.” Curiously, from the pen of a well-read nineteenth-century socialist as commonly as his twenty-first-century descendant, it was all “the work of private enterprise, the State having done very little in this direction.” 

Let’s close with how Norberg opens his introduction, timely enough quoting Mokyr from The Lever of Riches: “A society that has ceased to concern itself with the progress of the past will soon lose belief in its capacity to progress in the future.”

May we once more look up at the sky — or the dusty records of our past civilizations — and wonder about our place in the stars instead of quibbling over our place in the dirt.