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Economy

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Austerity comes from the Greek word “austeros,” connoting harsh, bitter, astringency. The first instance of the word to mean fiscal discipline was in 1937, when John Maynard Keynes admonished a fretful President Roosevelt that “the boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury.”

That view appears to have changed slightly, in the sense that now austerity, even during “the boom,” is suspect. Paul Krugman said, “Slashing government spending destroys jobs and causes the economy to shrink”; Joseph Stiglitz warned that austerity “doesn’t work; it does not lead to more efficient, faster growing economies.” 

In an excellent recent book, What Went Wrong with Capitalism?, Ruchir Sharma notes that the standard narrative describing neoliberalism is the systematic “gutting” of government programs, and the imposition of “austerity.”  But Sharma goes on to note that the important question is not whether austerity “works,” but whether it even happened.

Sharma is right to ask. With apologies to Musa al-Gharbi, we have never been austere.

US Government Spending, Examined

The complaints of those who decry “neoliberal austerity” center on cutbacks in government spending.  A “cut,” to be clear, is when the government spends less in year t+1 than it spent in year t.

Now, it is fair to evaluate such claims on their merits and ask whether cutting back on government spending would be harmful, or might even be beneficial. My purpose here is simpler: I am going to evaluate the empirical claim that government spending has been (I found published examples of all these) slashed, starved, decimated, hollowed out, stripped down, or rolled back.

The US is a federal system, meaning that there are overlapping jurisdictions that have different systems for raising and spending money. So “government spending” is actually separable into two parts: federal, and state/local. I am going to evaluate the claims about austerity by looking at the level of government spending over time. 

There are many places to start, but I chose 1960. In that year, the federal government spent $77 billion; in 2025 the amount will be close to $7 trillion.  But those are “nominal” or current dollars, and it is misleading to label inflation increases as spending increases. In fact, the austerists might even have a point: if spending rose, but by less than the rate of inflation, that would effectively be a spending cut, in terms of what the money will buy.  So I have depicted government spending, both federal (orange line) and state/local (blue line), in constant 2020 dollars.

Figure 1: Federal Government Total Expenditures: St Louis Fed. W019RC1A027NBEA

Obviously, controlling for inflation produces no evidence of any kind of cutbacks, or for that matter, a slowdown in growth, for government spending. 

Two eras are worth particular note: The Reagan era (1981-1989) and the Obama era (2009-2017).  If you took away the horizontal axis and asked someone to pick out the time of the notorious “Reagan government spending cutbacks,” they would certainly not choose the actual Reagan era. There was no cutback in spending under Reagan, at least at the federal level, where the cuts were supposedly so dramatic.  And even at the state/local level, the “cuts” were simply a pause in growth, not a reduction.

The Obama era, at least after the financial crisis, did see a pause in spending increases. But remember, these data are controlled for inflation, and for population. There were actually sharp increases in the dollar amounts budgeted; the increases were just less than the trend everywhere else. There are no cuts, never, not anywhere in the whole picture, until the “cuts” resulting from the expiration of the temporary “Carnival of COVID Spending” in 2022.

But (an austerist might object) the population has increased. The true measure of budget cutbacks must account for spending per capita!

I once accepted this argument as valid, but my friend Kevin Grier pointed out to me that it is bizarre. After all, economists usually argue that governments supply public goods, or create a regulatory framework in which other market failures can be corrected. But these activities, by definition, require what economists call “non-rival” consumption. In English, that means that adding more “consumers” does not change the cost of provision of the service. National defense, the “canonical” (get it? Canon?) public good, is entirely independent of the number of people in a given state, or in the country. Defending the territory of the US has nothing to do with the number of people living there. Revenue and tax income can depend on population, but there is no obvious reason why spending has to be “controlled” for population.

Nonetheless, let’s do this. Figure 2 depicts the history of government spending per capita, 1960–2022, in constant 2020 dollars.

Figure 2: State and local government total expenditures, in 2020 dollars.
St. Louis Fed. W079RC1A027NBEA  (FRED data)

The same basic pattern, of constant increase, is clear. There is absolutely no evidence (none!) of a spending cut, or even a change in the rate of growth, at any point in the supposedly draconian “neoliberal” Reagan-Bush years.   

One can imagine the austerist thinking hard now, desperate to save their pet theory of economics, which requires that neoliberalism caused austerity.  “AHA! I’ve got it!” our austerist says. “GDP! You have to normalize government spending as a proportion of GDP!  Government must have shrunk by that measure!”

To find out, consider Table 1: a set of stacked bar charts for 1960, 1990, and 2020. The sections of each bar are the percentages of GDP made up of federal, and state/local, government spending.

Figure 3: Population B230RC0A052NBEA and per capita GDP 
(FRED data)

Clearly, this measure — which, because it is a percentage at a point in time, also controls for both population and inflation — shows the biggest increase of all. Total government spending was only 30 percent of GDP in 1960, but it is 40 percent (and growing) today.

Now, there are some arguments that government spending of any type doesn’t belong in GDP in the first place. But let’s put that to one side. Government spending has increased, sharply and consistently, for the entire period that is usually labeled as “neoliberal austerity” by critics. That’s true even if you control for inflation, and population growth, and consider spending as a proportion of GDP.

We have never been austere. So why do we hear so much about “austerity”?

Austerity as Sleight of Hand

In fairness, there have certainly been advocates for something like real austerity throughout some of the great economic disruptions of American history.  In his autobiography, Herbert Hoover famously quoted Andrew Mellon, then Treasury Secretary, in November 1929 (immediately after the Crash, in October) this way:

[T]he ‘leave it alone liquidationists’ headed by Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, …felt that government must keep its hands off and let the slump liquidate itself. Mr. Mellon had only one formula: ‘”‘Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate.’”‘ He insisted that, when the people get an inflation brainstorm, the only way to get it out of their blood is to let it collapse. He held that even a panic was not altogether a bad thing. He said: ‘It will purge the rottenness out of the system. High costs of living and high living will come down. People will work harder, live a more moral life. Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks from less competent people.’

Hoover not only ignored this advice but introduced a flurry of behind-the-scenes spending (as documented by Amity Shlaes) to try to stimulate the economy.  Still, because Mellon was the public face of the administration, there is a perception that austerity was tried. It wasn’t.

What is interesting is that the very definition of austerity was changed so that it became possible to point at actual examples. The sleight of hand, which has been noted but not fully understood, is that “austerity” was changed from meaning “cutting the level of government spending” to its current meaning: “cutting the growth in government spending.”

In 1981, there was a famous article in The Atlantic entitled “The Education of David Stockman.” The most important part of that “education” was Stockman having to face the hard truth that a “spending cut” is not reduced spending. It is a reduction in the amount by which spending will be increased in the future.  So, if we are scheduled to increase government spending by 10 percent, and we only increase spending by six percent, that is a four percent cut. This question of the definition of a “cut” was central to Congressional politics in the 1990s. In 2011, Stockman noted (correctly) that the supposed $38 billion in “reductions” in the Obama budget were actually a substantial increase.

But no one paid attention. The “austerity” story was too important for the standard narrative of the left. Mike Konczal wrote in Dissent magazine, on January 19, 2017, that “Austerity, both as a practice and as a metaphor, defined the landscape, culture, and politics of the Obama era.” In fact, as we saw in Figures 1 and 2, spending increased substantially between 2009 and 2017, both in real terms and per capita. Politicians made a big show of cutting some of the proposed increases from budgets in 2011, 2012, and 2013, and that version of events has become the widespread perception.

My point is more than simple pedantry.  While it is annoying to hear the false “austerity narrative” constantly repeated as Progressive gospel, the real problem is the policy implication. If we permit the “austerity cuts caused poverty, we need to spend more!” fable to become the stylized fact on which policy is based, we will not only be thinking of the wrong solution, but we’ll be working from a false history.

The howls of disapproval from the cowboy-hat demographic have been loud this week, and for good reason. President Trump has announced plans to quadruple the import quota of Argentine beef to “bring beef prices down” at the grocery aisle. It was accompanied by a characteristically Trumpian broadside on Truth Social:

“The Cattle Ranchers, who I love, don’t understand that the only reason they are doing so well, for the first time in decades, is because I put Tariffs on cattle coming into the United States,” Trump said on Truth Social on Wednesday. “If it weren’t for me, they would be doing just as they’ve done for the past 20 years — Terrible! It would be nice if they would understand that, but they also have to get their prices down, because the consumer is a very big factor in my thinking, also!”

In a single post he managed to both praise and insult the very people who embody the mythos of American self-reliance. You don’t talk down to cowmen — as a rule they’re damn sensitive to being told their fortunes hinge on the beneficence of a politician. As an example of the pitfalls of dabbling in command economics, you can’t conjure a better case study.

Ranchers are no fools — they know that prosperity in a tenuous sector doesn’t come from tariffs, subsidies, or decrees. It comes from hard work and resilient management in the face of fickle weather and shifting markets. When a big-city billionaire — even one they’ve largely endorsed — tells them “you’re doing well because of me,” the reflexive response is basically what I heard from a cowboy buddy in Arizona: “Gaslight us harder, Mr. President.

Trump is right: cattle prices have been astonishingly high the past few seasons, for a variety of extremely complicated factors mostly having to do with the size of the national cow herd. But Trump is laughably off base to attribute the recent high prices to his tariffs, which to the extent they had any effect at all, were applied long after the rise in cattle prices.

Trump’s maneuvering reflects the deepest problems of a command economy — you simply can’t foresee the knock-on effects of various market manipulations. Once you start tinkering — raising tariffs to curry favor with domestic producers, then slashing them to win over consumers, or allocating tariff revenues to those who are harmed by the tariffs — you trap yourself in the same contradictory logic that doomed the old Soviet planners. Every knob you twist sends vibrations through a market ecosystem too vastly complex to predict.

Take beef, which is a deceptively “simple” product. It isn’t. Its price is the result of feedlot margins, grazing leases, rail freight rates, hide buyer availability, veterinarian fees, hay producer margins, and farm credit, and a kaleidoscope of other factors. Like many industries, it is also heavily influenced by government regulations, including tariffs. Price signals ripple through this vast and interconnected network like nerve signals in a living body. Interference with one aspect risks numbing the whole. Beef, as a product of the modern integrated global market is no more “simple” than a semiconductor, and managing its price is a fool’s errand.

Ranchers can no more unilaterally “get their prices down” than they could unilaterally get their prices up over the 20 years when they were doing “Terrible.” Cow-calf producers (the foundational unit of the beef complex) take 400-600 pound calves to sale and pretty much take whatever price is being offered by the “buyers” (usually background/stocker/feedlot representatives). Those prices have, for decades, been marginal at best and were often lower than the input costs. In the absence of a vigorous small-scale meat processing complex (regulated largely out of existence), the options were limited. That has changed recently with the higher prices that come with lower inventories, and many ranchers are regaining some solvency lost over preceding years, but they all know it’s out of their control. Like the rain, they take it when they can get it.

Still, ranchers are right to feel whiplash. One day, they’re told tariffs are patriotic; the next day, they’re scolded for high prices. They are pawns in a political game that treats them alternately as mascots and villains. The message from Washington — sometimes in the same sentence — is: We love you, but you’re doing it wrong. This is the cultural insult buried at the heart of Trump’s missive. Rural America has long sensed that its independence is something to be managed, not respected. Trump insists that cowmen owe their good fortune to his tariff policy, but by doing so he adopts the same paternalism that ranchers despise in bureaucrats from either party. Whether the diktat comes from a Manhattan boardroom or the White House, it still smells like the city: clueless and smug, all at the same time.

The kind of economic nationalism Trump has unleashed pretends to restore dignity to the producers and manufacturers forgotten by globalization. But true dignity never comes from protection — it comes from freedom. Give ranchers open access to world markets, stable rules, reduced regulations, and the assurance that government won’t yank the reins every election cycle, and they’ll take care of the rest. The West was not won on quota systems.

What’s galling about this latest announcement isn’t just the inconsistency; it’s the presumption that prosperity can be engineered by presidential decree. Beef markets, like any living system, balance themselves through millions of daily decisions — when to calve, when to sell, when (or if) to buy feed, when to hold back heifers. That’s the invisible hand at work, and it’s far smarter than any White House staffer with a spreadsheet.

Politicians often say they “love” the rancher, the farmer, the working man. But love, in economics as in life, is best revealed by respectful restraint. Don’t interfere. Don’t pretend to know better. Don’t weaponize one group against another in the name of populist sympathy. Ronald Reagan, the cowboy president, said the nine most terrifying words one could hear was “I’m from the government and I’m here to help.” As the cattle industry turns its back on Trump’s meddling, he is about to learn the political perils of a command economy as well. The best thing Washington could do for the beef industry is to stop helping it.

Introduction

Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, is a joint federal-state program that finances health care to the poor.[1] When it was first signed into law, Medicaid eligibility was limited to low-income children, pregnant women, parents of dependent children, the elderly, and people with disabilities. In the sixty years since the program was enacted, however, it has strayed from its mission of providing healthcare for the most vulnerable and has become a steppingstone toward universal government-run health insurance.

This explainer will outline how Medicaid functions, the program’s costs, its influence on healthcare in the United States, and how the proposed policy changes in 2025 could reshape the program.

How Does Medicaid Work?

Medicaid is divided into two groups: traditional Medicaid and the Medicaid Expansion group. Before discussing the differences between the two, it’s important to understand that there are strings attached. For a state to participate in Medicaid (either traditional or expansion), the federal government requires that state to provide Medicaid coverage for certain eligibility groups, including[2]:

  • Certain low-income families, including parents, that meet the financial requirements of the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cash assistance program;
  • Pregnant women with annual income at or below 133% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL);
  • Children with family income at or below 133% of FP;
  • Aged, blind, or disabled individuals who receive cash assistance under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program;
  • Children receiving foster care, adoption assistance, or kinship guardianship assistance under the Social Security Act (SSA) Title IV–E;
  • Certain former foster care youth;
  • Individuals eligible for the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary program; and
  • Certain groups of legal permanent resident immigrants.

Federal law provides two primary benefit packages for state Medicaid programs: traditional benefits and alternative benefit plans (ABPs). These benefit categories (taken from the Congressional Research Service) are recreated in Table 1. States also have some flexibility through Medicaid program waivers, which allow them to be exempt from certain federal requirements. These include research and demonstration projects (Section 1115), managed care/freedom of choice programs (Section 1915(b)), and home and community-based services (Section 1915(c)). To receive a waiver, a state must meet federal financing requirements such as budget neutrality, cost-effectiveness, or cost-neutrality.[3]

It is also important to note that Medicaid spending is often lumped in with the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and similar federal subsidies created under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act or ACA). The CHIP program provides health coverage to eligible children in families with incomes above the Medicaid threshold, either through Medicaid or separate state programs. The federal subsidies created under the ACA include premium tax credits (which subsidize the cost of an insurance premium) and cost-sharing reductions (reducing out-of-pocket costs such as deductibles, copays, and coinsurance) for those who purchase health insurance through a government-created healthcare marketplace.

Traditional Medicaid

Traditional Medicaid covers both primary and acute care as well as long-term services and supports (such as care for disabled adults and individuals with chronic illnesses). Eligibility is limited to low-income children, pregnant women, parents of dependent children, the elderly, and people with disabilities. In this program, states are guaranteed federal matching dollars without a cap for qualified services, based on a formula that matches at least 50 percent of state spending. The portion of the federal government’s share of most Medicaid expenditures is known as the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). This matching rate increases as state per-capita income decreases.

Under traditional Medicaid, states define the specific features of each covered benefit within four broad federal guidelines:

  • Each service must be sufficient in amountduration, and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose. States may place appropriate limits on a service based on such criteria as medical necessity.
  • Within a state, services available to the various population groups must be equal in amount, duration, and scope (the comparability rule).
  • With certain exceptions, the amount, duration, and scope of benefits must be the same statewide (the statewideness rule).
  • With certain exceptions, enrollees must have freedom of choice among health care providers.[4]

Looking ahead to FY 2026 (October 1, 2025 – September 30, 2026), the federal matching rates for state funds are expected to range from 50 percent (the mandatory minimum matching rate) to nearly 77 percent.[5] Figure 1 shows the federal Medicaid FMAP matching rate for each state.

Figure 1: Federal FMAP Percentages, FY 2026

Sources: KFF estimates of increased FY 2026 FMAPs based on Federal Register, November 29, 2024 (Vol 89, No. 230), pp 94742-94746.

Note: Estimates are rounded to the nearest whole number.

The Medicaid Expansion Group

Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), states had the option to expand Medicaid to non-elderly adults with income up to 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level.  When states were initially allowed to expand Medicaid starting January 1, 2014, the federal government promised to cover 100 percent of Medicaid expansion costs to encourage states to participate. With this promise of a “free lunch,” many states rushed to expand Medicaid, sharply increasing enrollment. By 2020, however, the federal match rate for the expansion program was reduced to 90 percent. As a result, states had to increase their own Medicaid spending, on average, $26.7 billion from 2017 to 2022 from their own sources.

As of 2025, all but 10 states have expanded Medicaid.[6] Those states are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: States that Have Not Expanded Medicaid as of 2025

Sources: KFF tracking and analysis of state actions related to adoption of the ACA Medicaid expansion and Searing, Adam. “Federal Funding Cuts to Medicaid May Trigger Automatic Loss of Health Coverage for Millions of Residents of Certain States.” Say Ahhh! Georgetown Center for Children and Families, November 27, 2024

How Much Does Medicaid Cost? Who Pays?

Given that Medicaid is a joint federal and state program, it is important to examine the costs of Medicaid at the federal and state levels. At the federal level, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and other healthcare marketplace subsidies enacted by the ACA cost $759 billion in FY 2024. Put another way, for every dollar the federal government spent, eleven cents of that dollar went to Medicaid, CHIP, and the ACA subsidies.[7]

At the state level, Medicaid accounts for about 30 percent of total state spending (capital inclusive) and is the single largest expenditure in all state budgets. For every dollar the average state spends, thirty cents go to Medicaid—only ten cents come from state revenue while the remaining 20 cents come from federal transfers.[8]

Although Medicaid was designed to be a “joint” funding program, state policymakers have found ways to get the federal government to cover the lion’s share of Medicaid spending. This reflects the incentives elected officials face: using accounting gimmicks to offer more generous Medicaid spending while passing the cost to federal taxpayers can help them win reelection.

This problem was exacerbated by Medicaid expansion under the ACA. Figure 3 (recreated from the CRS report) shows the breakdown of federal and state Medicaid spending. The percentages atop each column indicate the federal share of total Medicaid spending.

Figure 3: Federal and State Shares of Medicaid Spending

Sources: Congressional Research Service “R43357: Medicaid: An Overview,” Figure 6: Federal and State Actual Medicaid expenditures CMS, Form CMS-64 Data as reported by states to the Medicaid Budget and Expenditure System, as of May 29, 2024, at https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/financial-management/state-expenditure-reporting-for-medicaid-chip/expenditure-reports-mbescbes. CPI-U inflation data collected from US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Notes: CMS, Form CMS-64 Data as reported by states to the Medicaid Budget and Expenditure System, as of May 29, 2024, at https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/financial-management/state-expenditure-reporting-for-medicaid-chip/expenditure-reports-mbescbes.

In the end, federal taxpayers are footing the bill for Medicaid. However, as the national debt continues to strain the federal budget and crowd out other priorities, policymakers in DC are desperate to cut costs. One likely area is federal Medicaid spending. If the federal government were to change the matching rates of either traditional Medicaid or Medicaid expansion, state spending on Medicaid would rapidly increase and crowd out other spending. In more fiscally distressed states, this could spur a fiscal crisis.

How Does Medicaid Impact Healthcare?

The size of Medicaid means that it shapes almost every corner of the American healthcare system, from hospital and acute care to long-term care to medical research. The program covers one in five Americans and finances 19 percent of all health spending in the United States. Here are some of the results of that influence.[9]

Increasing Coverage with Little to Show for Health Access or Outcomes

Medicaid increases healthcare coverage. Thanks to the Medicaid Expansion under the ACA and more generous federal matching programs created during the COVID-19 era and through the Biden administration’s stimulus packages, enrollment in Medicaid dramatically increased and the percentage of uninsured Americans decreased, reaching an all-time low in 2022.[10]

Additionally, while use of healthcare services increased, other negative outcomes emerged that decreased access to care, especially for those in traditional Medicaid. Cannon (2022a) notes that the Medicaid Expansion under the ACA creates an incentive for state policymakers to prioritize Medicaid expansion group recipients over traditional Medicaid recipients.[11] Blase and Gonshorowski (2025) confirmed these findings, noting that Medicaid expansion decreased access to care, crowded out private options, and shifted funds away from the poorest Medicaid recipients.[12]

In a review of the literature, Sigaud (2025) also finds depressing results[13] States that expanded Medicaid saw longer wait times and reduced access to care for traditional Medicaid enrollees. Additionally, he notes that symptoms of depression increased among near-elderly adults on Medicaid before and after expansion, especially among rural residents with extremely limited access to mental health providers. He also notes slower ambulance response times and greater delays in the emergency room.

Cementing the Relationship Between Employment and Healthcare

Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act further entrenched employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) as the backbone of American healthcare. The ACA kept the ESI tax structure in place, essentially creating what Cannon (2022b) calls “an implicit penalty on workers who do not (a) surrender control of a sizable portion of their earnings to an employer; (b) enroll in a health plan that their employers choose, control, and revoke upon separation; and (c) pay the balance of the premium directly.”[14]

In an ideal world, Americans would not need to leave their jobs to change healthcare provider networks. Unfortunately, if Americans want a different health insurance package, they must “fire” their employer, pay a large tax penalty for choosing an employer-sponsored plan, or be stuck with an inferior, public option.

Increasing the Cost of Healthcare

Medicaid costs for healthcare are much greater than the costs of healthcare in the private sector. In my AIER paper “The Work vs Welfare Tradeoff Revisited,” I found that Medicaid paid more per full-year equivalent enrollee than the average annual single premium for an employer-sponsored plan in 43 states.[15] Despite the higher payments, health outcomes for Medicaid recipients are not better than those of Americans with private insurance.

The reason why Medicaid is so costly comes from the incentives created under the joint federal-state funding relationship, as discussed in the previous section. Cannon (2022a) elaborates, “Spending $1 on police buys $1 of police protection. Spending $1 on Medicaid, however, buys $2 to $10 of medical or long-term care. Medicaid rewards states for spending the marginal dollar on medical and long-term care even when spending it on police, education, or transportation would provide greater benefit.”[16]State officials have an incentive to maximize Medicaid while cutting basic public services. The open-ended federal matching system allows states to maximize federal matching dollars (especially for expansion populations) through gimmicks such as provider tax loopholes.[17]As spending on the expansion population increases, traditional Medicaid enrollees are pushed aside, leading to less access to care and worsening health outcomes.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) regularly lists Medicaid (and its relative Medicare) among the “High-Risk” list for improper payments. The GAO notes that Medicaid program integrity must be strengthened through both legislation and “coordinated effort across multiple entities.”[18] Additionally, America is one of the most charitable nations in the world. In closing, Mueller opines,

In other words, Medicaid is rife with waste, fraud, and abuse, and fixing it is no small task.

Increased Regulatory Complexity

Medicaid also has a significant impact on the nature and shape of healthcare regulations. Federal rules dictating how states shape their Medicaid policies discourage innovation, research, and flexibility because state policymakers want to maximize those federal matching dollars. Furthermore, states will shape their own healthcare regulations to ensure compliance with federal Medicaid guidelines and maximize federal Medicaid funding. This results in states limiting access to new therapies to control costs.

What Do the 2025 Policy Changes Mean for Medicaid?

In 2025, two major policy changes have impacted Medicaid: proposed changes under the “One Big Beautiful Bill” (H.R. 1) and a Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services proposed rule to close a provider tax loophole. These changes have the potential to provide immediate fixes to Medicaid, but much deeper reforms are needed.

The largest change comes from the legislative and CMS rule changes toward Medicaid provider taxes. The changes in H.R. 1 phase the Medicaid provider tax rate from 6 percent to 3.5 percent and freeze any new provider taxes created[19] It would also mandate waiver resubmissions and suspend existing approvals in noncompliant states. These reforms would ensure Medicaid financing aligns with federal intent, helps reduce wasteful spending, and prevents states from misusing federal Medicaid funds for other general fund programs.[20] It would also mandate waiver resubmissions and suspend existing approvals in noncompliant states. These reforms would ensure Medicaid financing aligns with federal intent, helps reduce wasteful spending, and prevents states from misusing federal Medicaid funds for other general fund programs.

Additionally, H.R. 1 also strengthens work requirements and eligibility checks, ensuring that verification standards are improved and states are allowed to remove ineligible enrollees from Medicaid.

These reforms, unfortunately, only scratch the surface. Deeper changes to Medicaid (as well as healthcare broadly) are needed. One such change is offered by economist David Rose. Rose writes,

“To put it simply, eliminate Obamacare, Medicare, and Medicaid and replace them with a national healthcare voucher system. This transformative change for American healthcare could be limited to the level paid for with a national sales tax, and our unfunded liability problems would simply disappear. While, for practical reasons, this would likely have to start at the national level, the goal could be to then spin it off to the states.”[21]

There is no shortage of ideas available for healthcare reform. The problem lies in changing the incentives that millions in the healthcare sector face (both in government and the private sector) that keep them maintaining the status quo.

Conclusion

Medicaid was designed to provide a safety net for the most vulnerable Americans. After sixty years, trillions spent, and millions of Americans enrolled, the program has little to show for it. It has strayed from its mission of helping the poor because policymakers prioritize maximizing federal matching rates. Medicaid spends more yet fails to provide better health care access or health outcomes, increases costs, and discourages choice and innovation in healthcare.

The United States—the wealthiest nation in history—and its people deserve health care that delivers access, valuable health outcomes, affordability, and choice. Market-driven solutions can provide such a system.


Footnotes


[1] Social Security Administration. Medicaid. In Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2015. https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2015/medicaid.html.

[2] Congressional Research Service. Medicaid: An Overview. R43357. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2023. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R43357.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] KFF. “Federal Matching Rate and Multiplier.” KFF State Health Facts. Accessed July 9, 2025. https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federal-matching-rate-and-multiplier.

[6] KFF. “Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions.” KFF. Accessed July 9, 2025. https://www.kff.org/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions.

[7]

[8]

[9] Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. The Benefits of Expanding Medicaid Eligibility to Low-Income Adults: Evidence from State Expansions. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, March 28, 2022. https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/benefits-expanding-medicaid-eligibility.

[10] Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. 2022 Uninsurance Rate at an All-Time Low: New Estimates Highlight the Role of the ACA and Medicaid Expansion. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, September 2022. https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/2022-uninsurance-at-all-time-low.

[11] Cannon, Michael F. Cato Institute. “Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.” In Cato Handbook for Policymakers, 9th ed., 2022. https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policymakers-9th-edition-2022/medicaid-childrens-health-insurance-program#perverse-incentives.

[12] Blase, Brian and Gonshorowski, Drew. “Resisting the Wave of Medicaid Expansion: Why Florida Is Right.” Paragon Institute. May 1, 2024. https://paragoninstitute.org/medicaid/resisting-the-wave-of-medicaid-expansion-why-florida-is-right.

[13] Sigaud, Liam. “Losing Focus: How the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion Left Traditional Enrollees Behind.” Paragon Prognosis, February 10, 2025. https://paragoninstitute.org/paragon-prognosis/losing-focus-how-the-acas-medicaid-expansion-left-traditional-enrollees-behind/#:~:text=A%202021%20analysis%20in%20Health,adverse%20outcomes%2C%20including%20higher%20mortality.e.

[14] Cannon, Michael F. Cato Institute. “The Tax Treatment of Health Care.” In Cato Handbook for Policymakers, 9th ed., 2022. https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policymakers-9th-edition-2022/tax-treatment-health-care#the-tax-exclusion-for-employer-sponsored-health-insurance.

[15] Savidge, Thomas. “The Work vs. Welfare Tradeoff Revisited.” American Institute for Economic Research, June 17, 2022. https://aier.org/article/the-work-vs-welfare-tradeoff-revisited/#medicaid.

[16] Cannon (2022a). supra note 11.

[17] Blase, Brian. Medicaid Provider Taxes: A Gimmick that Exposes the Flaws in Medicaid’s Financing. Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, June 20, 2023. https://www.mercatus.org/research/research-papers/medicaid-provider-taxes-gimmick-exposes-flaws-medicaids-financing.

[18] U.S. Government Accountability Office. Medicaid Financing: Actions Needed to Ensure Provider Taxes Do Not Undermine Federal Oversight. GAO-25-107743, May 2025. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107743.

[19] U.S. Congress. H.R. 1: “One Big Beautiful Reconciliation Act of 2025,” 119th Cong., 1st sess., § 71115, “Provider Taxes” (2025). https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1/text

[20] Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Preserving Medicaid Funding for Vulnerable Populations by Closing Health Care-Related Tax Loophole: Proposed Rule. Fact Sheet. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, May 2, 2024. https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/preserving-medicaid-funding-vulnerable-populations-closing-health-care-related-tax-loophole-proposed#_ftn2.

[21] Rose, David C. “Want to Fix Medicaid? Look to Milton Friedman.” The Daily Economy, June 6, 2025. https://thedailyeconomy.org/article/want-to-fix-medicaid-look-to-milton-friedman.